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Summary
This thesis deals with soft-information based decoding for optical and quantum commu-
nication application which uses low number of photon either at the transmitter for security
reasons or at the receiver because of some extreme optical environment.In this thesis, both
single photon and multi-photon transmission will be considered when characterizing the
quantum communication system in the context of the proposed QKD protocol. When re-
ferring to multi-photon transmission, coherent states will be considered, generated using
weak laser pulses (WLP) sources.
The main part of the thesis is focused on soft information based information reconcilia-
tion for Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). A novel composite channel model for QKD is
identified, which includes a parallel of private quantum channel and a public classic chan-
nel. The information is transmitted on private quantum channel and redundancy on the
public classical channel. The Log-Likelihood Ratios, - also called soft-metrics - derived
from the two channels are jointly processed at the receiver, exploiting capacity achiev-
ing soft-metric based iteratively decoded block codes. The performance of the proposed
mixed-soft-metric algorithms are studied via simulations as a function of the system pa-
rameters.
Other low photon number applications have also been considered, such as weak-laser
pulses (WLP) communication.In both Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and high-photon
efficiency optical communications with direct detection, the transmission channel is typi-
cally modeled either as a Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC), or a Poisson Photon Channel
(PPC) with binary input, and the sufficient statistic at the channel output is typically ob-
tained with a simple hard decision on the received random variable. The availability of
public side-channel information typical of QKD applications, or the multilevel character-
istic of the Poissonian output of weak-energy optical links may however allow the use
of soft metrics and of soft-metric-based iteratively decoded error correcting codes, which
may be useful to counteract the channel errors typical of such low-energy channels.
In this thesis we will indeed show how soft-metric based metrics can be obtained in the
considered scenarios, and how capacity achieving Forward Error Correcting (FEC) codes
such as soft-metric based Low Density Parity Check (LDPC) codes and polar codes can
be employed over QKD and Poisson cannels, exploring the limits of the achievable perfor-
mance gains. We show that the classical channel capacity of the suggested BIMO model
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is higher than the capacity of the BSC model, and that the use of the BIMO model allows
to feed the channel decoder with soft information, in the form of Log-Likelihood Ratios
(LLRs), achieving a significant reduction in Bit Error Rate (BER) and Frame Error Rate
(FER) with respect to classical hard-metric-based schemes which should be used in con-
junction with a BSC channel model. Furthermore, the possible application of soft-metrics
to information reconciliation protocols is discussed, with the goal of designing QKD pro-
tocols able to take advantage of the available soft-information. In particular, the use of
FEC codes for information reconciliation could lead to QKD protocols able to minimize
the interaction between transmitter (Alice) and receiver (Bob), allowing for higher quan-
tum bit-error-rates.
This thesis also offers a preliminary investigation on the use of FEC LDPC codes for
information reconciliation when the underlying channel is a Q-ary DMC, for QKD ap-
plications based on higher photon flux levels with spatial entanglement of twin beams in
PDC, and shows that acceptable error reconciliation efficiency values are obtained with
reasonable complexity.
In general, the availability of the soft-metric allows for the use of advanced iterative soft-
decoding techniques during the information reconciliation phase, significantly reducing
the residual bit and frame error rates with subsequent impact on the achievable secret key
rates which is, as said before, is one of the fundamental performance guideline in QKD.
The proposed protocol, while having a negligible cost, can reduce the residual FER in
QKD systems, largely reducing the interaction required between the two parties involved,
increasing the key rate and protecting the secrecy of the information exchanged
IV
Acknowledgments
First of all i would like to thank God almighty for giving me the strength and ability to
perform this task.
It is with immense gratitude that I acknowledge the support and help of my supervisor
Prof. Marina Mondin for showing her trust in me and for her constant commitment in
teaching me as researcher and professional,all the while maintaining the most of humble
and appreciative attitude, more than a tutor she has been like a mother to me. I owe my
deepest gratitude to her husband prof.Fred Daneshgaran from California state university
Los Angeles for his ideas, help and availability, and I consider it an honor to work with
them.
We all have people in our lives who make success both possible and rewarding. My family
steadfastly supported and encouraged me during the low and high times.My profound love
and thanks to my parents and family members for their constant support and kindness at
every stage of my life.
I would also like to thank prof. Marco Genovese, Stefano Olivares,Francesca Vatta and
Telecom Italia for research collaboration during my PhD.
Deepest thanks and regards to my senior and colleague Maria Teresa Delgado for her help
and assistance.
I would like to thank Higher Education Commission (HEC) Pakistan for providing me
financial support during my PhD.
I can not complete this acknowledgement without thanking all my friends who have been
a family for me in Italy.
V
Table of contents
Summary III
Acknowledgments V
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 Background 6
2.1 Weak energy optical communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.1 Stressed free-space optical communication . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.2 Low probability of intercept (LPI) optical communication . . . . 7
2.1.3 Quantum communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Classical Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.2 Secret-Key Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.3 Public-Key Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 Quantum Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.2 Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3.2.1 Generalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.2.2 The BB84 Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3 Capacity achieving Codes 21
3.1 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.1.1 Shannon’s noisy channel coding theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.1.2 Binary Discrete Memoryless Channel (B-DMC) . . . . . . . . . 22
3.1.2.1 Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC) . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.1.2.2 Mutual Information and Bhattacharyya parameter . . . 23
3.2 Low Density Parity Check (LDPC) Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
VI
3.2.1 Matrix representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2.2 Graphical representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2.3 Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.2.4 Decoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2.5 Density Evaluation (DE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.3 Polar Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.3.1 Channel Polarization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.3.2 Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.3.3 Decoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4 Soft-Metric based decision in QKD and Poisson photons channels 35
4.1 Overview and System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.2 Information Reconciliation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.3 Soft Metric Based QKD protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.3.1 Code Rate and security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.4 System Characterization and Channel Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.4.1 Classical Communication System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.4.2 Quantum Communication System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.4.2.1 Single-Photon Quantum Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.4.2.2 Binary Input Multiple Output (BIMO) Quantum Channel 45
5 Capacity of Bayesian Inference Quantum Channel employing Photon count-
ing detectors 50
5.1 Capacity Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
6 LDPC Coding for QKD at Higher Photon Flux Levels Based on Spatial En-
tanglement of Twin beams in PDC 56
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
6.2 Development of the Channel Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
6.3 Information Reconciliation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
7 Performance results 65
7.1 Simulations Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
7.2 Performance Results for Weak Energy Optical Communication . . . . . . 66
7.2.1 Performance with LDPC codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
7.2.2 Performance with Polar codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
7.3 Performance Results for QKD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
8 Conclusion 77
Bibliography 79
VII
List of figures
2.1 Secret Key Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 public Key Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Quantum key distribution comprises a quantum channel and a public clas-
sical authenticated channel. As a universal convention in quantum cryp-
tography, Alice sends quantum states to Bob through a quantum channel.
Eve is suspected of eavesdropping on the line. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4 The four states of the BB84 Protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.5 The BB84 Protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.6 Distillation process and key length in BB84 Protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.1 Binary Symmetric Channel with crossover probability p . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2 Tanner Graph representation of the LDPC code corresponding to the par-
ity check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.3 Channel Combining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.1 System model in a QKD system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.2 Source coding with side information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.3 Equivalent systematic block-code in QKD system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.4 Composite Channel model, systematic FEC code with code rate Rc =
nq/(nq + r). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.5 Classic AWGN model for the public channel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.6 Classical Communication Channel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.7 Equavelent QKD channel composed of clasical AWGN and Quantum
BSC channel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.8 Equavelent QKD channel composed of clasical AWGN and Quantum
BSC channel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.9 The considered low-complexity photon-counting scheme. . . . . . . . . . 46
4.10 BIMO channel model of the considered system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.11 Equavelent QKD channel composed of classical AWGN and Quantum
BIMO channel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.1 Classical capacity of BIMO DMC(solid curve) compared to the equiva-
lent BSC with transition probability QBER, as a function of mean photon
count Nc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
1
List of figures
5.2 Classical capacity of BIMO DMC and equivalent BSC with transition
probability QBER as a function of phase diffusion parameter ∆ for three
different values of Nc (solid line: Nc = 9, dash-dot line: Nc = 6, dash
line: Nc = 3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
6.1 General block diagram of the experimental setup from [62]. . . . . . . . . 57
6.2 A detection region identified as a square on the upper right corner whereby
the condition that the number of speckles in the region is much larger than
that on the perimeter is satisfied. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
6.3 Pictorial representation of the impact of eavesdropping by Eve on the
measured correlation statistic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
6.4 The considered Q-ary channel model (Q = 4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
7.1 The composite channel (composed of the parallel secure and public chan-
nels) linking transmitter and receiver in QKD applications. . . . . . . . . 66
7.2 BER comparison for rate 0.61 LDPC(408,252) and rate 0.8 LDPC(1000,800)
versus uncoded Quantum BSC and BIMO channels as a function of QBER 67
7.3 BER and FER performance of BSC and BIMO channels with LDPC code
at rate 0.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
7.4 BER and FER simulation results for a LDPC code with a) k = 500,r =
500 and code rate Rc = 0.5, b) k = 252, r = 156 and code rate Rc = 0.6
1and c) k = 750, r = 250 and code rate Rc = 0.75, obtained with
different models of the quantum channel: BSC (Q-BSC curves), AWGN
(Q-AWGN curves) and BIMO DMC (Q-BIMO curves) . . . . . . . . . . 69
7.5 BER simulation results for a LDPC code with code rate Rc = 0.5,0.61
and 0.75 obtained with different models of the quantum channel: BSC
(Q-BSC curves), and BIMO DMC (Q-BIMO curves) . . . . . . . . . . . 70
7.6 BER simulation results for a LDPC code with code rate Rc = 0.5,0.61
and 0.75 obtained with different models of the quantum channel:AWGN
(Q-AWGN curves), and BIMO DMC (Q-BIMO curves) . . . . . . . . . . 70
7.7 Polar codes vs LDPC for BSC at rate 0.7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
7.8 Polar codes vs LDPC for BIMO at rate 0.7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
7.9 BER and FER performance of two LDPC codes with block length n =
504 and Rc = 0.5 and n = 408 and Rc = 0.61, respectively, as a function
of the private channel QBER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
7.10 BER and FER performance of LDPC codes with block length n = 408
and Rc = 0.61, respectively, as a function of the private channel QBER,
obtained with different models of the quantum channel: BSC (Q-BSC
curves), AWGN (Q-AWGN curves) and BIMO DMC (Q-BIMO curves). . 73
7.11 BER and FER performance of LDPC codes with block length n = 1000,nq =
750and Rc = 0.75, respectively, as a function of the private channel
QBER, obtained with different models of the quantum channel: BSC (Q-
BSC curves), AWGN (Q-AWGN curves) and BIMODMC (Q-BIMO curves 74
2
7.12 BER simulation results for a LDPC code with code rate Rc = 0.5,0.61 and
0.75 obtained with BIMO channel for different values of Nc . . . . . . . 74
7.13 BER performances of a (1000,800) binary LDPC over the Q-ary channel
in Figure 6.4 for (2) p1 = (QBER)
2 , (3) p1 = (QBER)
2/2 and (4)
p1 = QBER/2 as a function of QBER, compared with (1) a BSC with
transition probability QBER. In (2), (3) and (4) p2 = QBER− p1 . . . . 75
7.14 Efficiency with LDPC codes for different coding rates. The red continu-
ous line is a graphical lower bound of the efficiency of the CASCADE IR
algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3
Chapter 1
Introduction
“Photonics is the optical equivalent of light. Photonic systems uses light, instead of
electricity, to process, store and transmit energy. Photonics is a pervasive technology,
which is capable of of significantly influencing communications and information systems
worldwide”.[1]
1.1 Motivation
Communication is the Key of almost all sorts of human interests, businesses and concerns,
that is why , since very long there has been a lot of work done in developing its technolo-
gies. The development and maturity in electronics and electromagnetic technology in the
past century has led to the improvement in speed and coverage of communications. The
high bandwidth demands for all sorts of communications and most importantly internet,
grew by the end of twentieth century. Optical communications became the solution be-
cause it can use the large bandwidth availability and high speed of light.
Optical communication (OC) uses light to transmit information, which travels faster and
provides larger bandwidth. Photons(i.e., light pulses) are very difficult to generate, mea-
sure and control, and hence has been used to transmit secret information. Optical commu-
nication can be achieved through fiber-optics as well as free-space technology. Over the
internet today, a large number of photons per information bit are used to transport infor-
mation. The optical communication technology needed to generate, measure and control
the optical pulses with such large number of photons is quite mature, and has several
commercial and military applications.
However, most long distance communication schemes used today employ relatively weak
laser sources with small mean photon count at the receiver and non-photon number dis-
criminating detectors with acceptable dark count rates and detector dead-times. Also for
several diplomatic and military applications low number of photons in a single pulse must
1
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be measured in order to decode an information bit. These low number of photon appli-
cations are being developed and deployed. More specifically these low energy optical
communication applications can be divided into[2]:
• Quantum communication.
• Stressed free-space optical communication.
• Low probability of intercept(LPI) optical communication.
Quantum communication take into account the transfer of quantum information be-
tween two locations, where the quantum nature of information is maintained. Today,
it is vital to ensure the secrecy of information being transmitted, not only for military
and diplomatic communication, but also in every day life. With the growth of computer
networks for business transactions and confidentiality of information, there is an ever in-
creasing need for encryption to insure the security of information being transmitted.
Cryptography is the science to encrypt and decrypt data by using some algorithms. En-
cryption is the process of encoding the original information (plaintext) in such a way that
only the authorized party can read it, the unreadable data is called ciphertext . Hence,
cryptography provides the advantage of making the information transfer over insecure
networks confidential. The process of converting the ciphertext back to plaintext is called
decryption.
Before transmission, an encryption algorithm and a secret key is used to encrypt the data.
The authorized recipient uses the same key to decrypt the information. The security of
this schemes is based on the distribution of the key to the legitimate recipients. Hence,
the Key distribution is the vital problem.
Classical conventional key distribution techniques depends on complex mathematical ap-
proaches. and its security is based on unproven assumptions and depends on the technol-
ogy available to an eavesdropper.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a technology to distribute, or rather generate, secure
random keys between two communicating parties using optical fiber or free-space as a
communication channel. The randomness and secrecy of the key is guaranteed by the
laws of quantum physics. It exploits the fact, that measurement of the state of the quan-
tum system cannot be done without perturbing it. QKD is combined with conventional
key distribution techniques(dual key agreement) to produce as secure key as the strongest
of the two original keys. Hence, contrary to its classical counterpart it provides uncondi-
tional security, independent to the technological progress.
QuantumKey Distribution has matured enough and is ready for commercialization. There
has been a great interest in experimental QKD, with the longest distance achieved upto
now of 148.7 km of Telecom fibers[3] and a transmission distance of the quantum bits
of 144 km in free-space [4], [5]. QkD is also available commercially. Although a lot of
research has been done on the security aspect of QKD there is still an enormous amount
2
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of work that needs to be accomplished to create a truly secure and reliable system. With
the commercial availability of quantum key distribution systems and hardware for secure
data transmissions, it is extremely important that the details of quantum key distribution
systems are explored and completely characterized.
Since the quantum bit error rate of a quantum channel used for QKD is high, as it uses
the fairly lossy fibre optic or even more lossy free-space medium, error correction and
detection protocols are very critical for its proper operation. Therefore, information rec-
onciliation in QKD requires more attention. Error detection is also an important aspect
in determining the presence or absence of an eavesdropper in the system. It is important
to use good codes that has better error correction and detection capabilities. Now a days,
LDPC and polar codes are believed to be capacity approaching and achieving respectively.
There are two types of decoding techniques: 1) hard decoding and 2) soft decoding. In
hard decoding the decoder takes fixed set of values(i.e, 0 and 1), while the input to a soft
decoder may take a range of values in-between. So in soft decoding there is an extra
amount of information that is associated to the reliability of the input information. The
extra information gives a better estimates of the original data. So a soft decision decoding
performs better than hard decoding in the presence of corrupted data [6].
1.2 Purpose
The focus of this research activity is to work on pragmatic information reconciliation ap-
plied to QKD schemes based on single photon or weak pulse laser (WPL) sources, so as
to use feed-forward techniques which minimize the interaction between transmitter and
receiver.
The core ideas of the thesis are employing Forward Error Correction (FEC) coding as
opposed to two-way communication for information reconciliation in QKD schemes, ex-
ploiting all the available information for data processing at the receiver including infor-
mation available from the quantum channel, since optimized use of this information can
lead to significant performance improvement, and providing a security versus secret-key
rate trade-off to the end-user within the context of QKD systems.
Moreover, as shown by accurate experimental studies, the communication channel used
for quantum key exchange is not able to reach high levels of reliability (the Quantum Bit
Error Rate -QBER may have a high value), both because of the inherent characteristics of
the system, and of the presence of a possible attacker. In order to obtain acceptable resid-
ual error rates, it is necessary to use a parallel classical and public channel, characterized
by high transmission rates and low error rates, on which to transmit only the redundancy
bits of systematic channel codes with performance possibly close to the capacity limit.
Furthermore, since the more redundancy is added by the channel code, the more the cor-
responding information can be used to decipher the private message itself, it becomes
3
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necessary to design high-rate codes obtained by puncturing a low-rate mother code, pos-
sibly achieving a redundancy such that elements of the secret message cannot be uniquely
determined from the redundancy itself, so for that purpose we designed high rate LDPC
codes. Using high rate codes increases the security with trade-off to performance.
Other low photon number applications have also been considered, such as weak-laser
pulses (WLP) communication. For that purpose, a low-complexity photon-counting re-
ceiver has been considered which may be employed in long-distance amplification-free
classical optical communication schemes, and which is typically modeled as an equiva-
lent Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC). We have developed a time varying Binary Input-
Multiple Output (BIMO) channel model for this low-complexity photon-counting re-
ceiver, and analyzed its performance in presence of soft-metric based capacity approach-
ing iteratively decoded error correcting codes, such as soft-metric based Low Density
Parity Check (LDPC) codes and polar codes. We show that the classical channel capacity
of the suggested BIMO model is higher than the capacity of the BSC model, and that the
use of the BIMO model allows to feed the channel decoder with soft information, in the
form of Log-Likelihood Ratios (LLRs), achieving a significant reduction in Bit Error Rate
(BER) and Frame Error Rate (FER) with respect to classical hard-metric-based schemes
which should be used in conjunction with a BSC channel model.
1.3 Outline
This thesis is organized as follows. The first chapter provides the motivation and purpose
behind this thesis.
In the second chapter a brief background on the description of low number of photon com-
munication applications have been given. The basis of classical cryptography are shortly
reviewed, followed by a short introduction to quantum cryptography, the structure and
functioning of a generic QKD protocol is discussed, using as a model one of the most fa-
mous protocol invented until now, the BB84 Protocol. In this Chapter particular attention
is paid to the Information Reconciliation stage, highlighting the weakness of performing
such an important task interactively between sender and receiver.
Third chapter introduces capacity achieving codes, such as Low Density Parity Check
(LDPC) codes and polar codes, its structure and the advantages of working with capac-
ity achieving codes in the context of practically any communication system, presenting
a condensed overview of the belief propagation algorithm used by the LDPC decoders,
channel polarization and successive cancellation decoding algorithms used by polar codes
, which is the core of soft-information processing techniques.
In the fourth Chapter, a composite channel model for quantum key distribution is iden-
tified: formed by the parallel of the private (quantum) channel and a classic channel. A
novel technique for forward error correction based information reconciliation is proposed,
exploiting capacity achieving soft-metric based iteratively decoded block codes. The core
4
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ideas of this chapter are:
a employing FEC coding as opposed to two-way communication for information recon-
ciliation, minimizing the interactions between transmitter and receiver;
b exploiting all the available information for data processing at the receiver including
information available from the quantum channel;
c use of quantum communication schemes whereby photon counting receivers are used
and the modeling of the BIMO Quantum-DMC channel.
Chapter 5 presents the potential improvements in key transmission rate in a Quantum Key
Distribution (QKD) scheme whereby photon-counting detectors are used at the receiver.
The classical capacity of such system is derived, showing the potential gains that photon
counting detectors can provide in the context of a realistic cost-effective scheme from an
implementation point of view.
Chapter 6 offers a preliminary investigation on the use of FEC LDPC codes for informa-
tion reconciliation when the underlying channel is a Q-ary DMC, for QKD applications
based on higher photon flux levels with spatial entanglement of twin beams in PDC, and
shows that acceptable error reconciliation efficiency values obtained with reasonable com-
plexity.
In the chapter 7 the performance results are presented. The performance obtained for
weak energy optical communication simulating only the quantum channel and for the
mixed-soft metric algorithms for QKD are studied via simulations as a function of the
system parameters, in the presence of LDPC and Polar codes, in particular the achievable
Bit Error Rates (BER) and Frame Error Rates (FER) are presented and confronted for
different models of the quantum channel.
In the Last chapter a short conclusions of the thesis have been presented.
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Chapter 2
Background
Optical communication is any type of communication in which light is used as a signal
carrier, instead of electrical current. The merits of optical communication include high
bandwidth, exceptionally low loss, great transmission range and no electromagnetic in-
terference.
When we think about light we don’t really think about what it is made of. For long, sci-
entist tried to resolve if light was a wave or a particle. Eighteenth century’s physicists
strongly believed that light was made of basic units, but certain properties like refraction
caused light to be reclassified as a wave. Thanks to Einstein and other renowned physi-
cists who resolved the issue.
Photons are the rudimentary particle of light. Photons have a unique property in that they
are both a particle and a wave. This is what allows photons unique properties like refrac-
tion and diffusion.
Because light is another form of energy it can be transferred or converted into other types.
In the case of the photoelectric effect the energy of light photons is transferred through
the photons bumping into the atoms of a giving material. This causes the atom that is hit
to lose electrons and thus make electricity.
2.1 Weak energy optical communication
Over the internet today, a large number of photons per information bit are used to trans-
port information. The optical communication technology needed to generate, measure
and control the optical pulses with such large number of photons is quite mature, and has
several commercial and military applications.
In binary optical communication, the logical information is encoded onto two different
states of the radiation field. After the propagation, the receiver should perform a mea-
surement, aimed at discriminating the two signals. Currently, most of the long-distance
amplification-free optical classical communication schemes employ relatively weak laser
6
2 – Background
sources with small mean photon count at the receiver. The same is true for quantum-
enhanced secure cryptographic protocols. This low number of photon applications are
being developed and deployed. More specifically these low energy optical communica-
tion applications can be divided into:
• Stressed free-space optical communication.
• Low probability of intercept (LPI) optical communication.
• Quantum communication.
The ideal technology for these limited number of photon application will be to use
single photon detector, which can reliably detect the presence of optical pulses and convert
its energy to electrical signals. There is an active research in the development of single
photon detectors, and the development and deployment of optical communication systems
using low number of photons rely on the enhancement of this technology[2].
2.1.1 Stressed free-space optical communication
As the name suggest the optical communication takes place under some extreme condi-
tions. These stressed conditions affect the number of photons available at the receiver.
The extreme conditions may be very large distance between the transmitter and the re-
ceiver or the stressed optical environment, such as, communication under water, in fog
or smoke, where there are scattering loses and which effects the transmission of photons.
In this scenario, a very large number of photons per pulse are used to encode the optical
signal but, very low number of photons is available for detection at the receiver because
of the nature of the link between the transmitter and the receiver.
For example, in satellite-earth optical communication the distance between transmitter
and receiver is very large, this very large distance reduces the number of photons avail-
ability for reception. The sensitivity of the communication receiver becomes more impor-
tant as the distance increases and the data rate that can be supported ultimately decreases.
Photons counting detectors especially single photon detectors provides the improved sen-
sitivity and stressed free-space optical communication application can take advantage of
it.
2.1.2 Low probability of intercept (LPI) optical communication
In most communication scenarios, it is desirable to transmit the information secretly and
securely i.e., military applications. In low probability of intercept (LPI) optical communi-
cation, the transmitter intentionally generates encoded optical pulses that contain a single
or, at most, a few photons in order to minimize the probability that an eavesdropper will
be able to detect the presence of the communication link.
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2.1.3 Quantum communication
Quantum communication is the art of transferring quantum information between two lo-
cations. In Quantum communication the most important factor is to maintain the quantum
nature of information being transmitted.
Photons are the only appropriate system for long distance quantum communication now
a day. Other systems have also been studied deeply, such as atoms or ions, however cur-
rently and in the near future their adaptation for quantum communication applications is
not feasible[7]. The loss of photons in the quantum channel is one of the drawback of
photon-based applications, which limits the bridgeable distance for single photons to the
order of 100 km with present silica fibers and detectors[8]. In principle, this problem can
eventually be overcome by subdividing the larger distance to be bridged into smaller sec-
tions over which quantum entanglement1 can be teleported2. The subsequent application
of so called “entanglement swapping”[9] may result in transporting of entanglement over
long distances. Quantum entanglement effects are used to create a binary communication
system that works across infinite distances. Consequently, it is of strategic importance to
develop the technology to send photons from one location to a distant one while preserv-
ing its truly quantum nature.
Quantum communication is a very broad field however; the most important sub-field is
quantum cryptography which has a very well-known application called Quantum Key
Distribution (QKD), which will be described later.
The subject of quantum communications brings together ideas from classical informa-
tion theory, computer science, and quantum physics. Classical information theory and
quantum mechanics fit together very well. In order to explain their relationship, an in-
troduction to classical information theory is given, along with the principles of quantum
mechanics. Before going in details of quantum cryptography and QKD a brief overview
of classical cryptography along with some quantum mechanics will be presented in the
next section.
1Quantum entanglement is a quantum mechanical phenomenon that transpires when groups of particles
are produced or interacted in such a way that the quantum state of each particle must subsequently be
described relative to the other, even though the individual objects may be spatially separated.
2Quantum teleportation is a process by which quantum information (e.g. the exact state of an atom or
photon) can be transmitted (exactly, in principle) from one location to another, with the help of classical
communication and previously shared quantum entanglement between the sending and receiving location.
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_teleportation>
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2.2 Classical Cryptography
2.2.1 Introduction
Secure communications and cryptography is as old as civilization itself. The Greek Spar-
tans for instance would cipher their military messages and, for Chinese, just the act of
writing the message constituted a secret message since almost no-one could read or write
Chinese. When Julius Caesar sent messages to his generals, he didn’t trust his messen-
gers, so he replaced every alphabet with a shift of 3 (i.e., in his messages with a D, every
B with an E, and so on) through the alphabet. The one who knew the shift by 3 rule could
decipher his messages.
Today, secure communication is not only important for some military or diplomatic ap-
plications, but cryptography is also becoming vital in everyday life. With the growth
of computer networks for business transactions and communication of confidential in-
formation there is an ever increasing need for encryption to ensure that the information
exchanged is secure and cannot be acquired by third parties.
Cryptography is the study and operation of encoding and decoding secret messages to
ensure secure communications. The main objective is to allow two participants, a sender
and an intended recipient who share no information initially to be able to communicate in
a form that is inscrutable to third parties. In addition, it is also important to authenticate
the messages exchanged so that they may not be altered during the communication. Both
of these aims can be fulfilled with provable security if the sender and the recipient are in
possession of a shared, secret “key”.
A key, which is a truly random sequence and deliver no useful information itself, is a
part of information that controls the operation of a cryptographic algorithm. In encryp-
tion, a key specifies the particular transformation of plaintext into ciphertext, or vice versa
during decryption. Keys are also used in other cryptographic algorithms, such as digital
signature schemes and message authentication codes.
The sender and intended recipient should be able to agree and possess secret key mate-
rial in such a way that third parties (“eavesdropper”) cannot acquire, not even partially.
Cryptography until the mid-1980 was founded on computational complexity of certain
trap-door one-way functions that are easy to compute in one direction, but very difficult
in the opposite direction. It is provably impossible to establish a secret key with con-
ventional communications, so key distribution has relied on the conditional security of
“difficult” mathematical problems in public key cryptography.
The search for unbreakable codes is one of the oldest themes of cryptographic research,
but until the last century all proposed systems have ultimately been broken.
In 1917, Gilbert S.Vernam proposed an unbreakable cryptosystem, hence called the Ver-
nam cipher or One-time Pad [10]. The One-time Pad is a special case of the substitution
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cipher3 , where each letter is advanced by a random number of positions in the alphabet.
These random numbers then form the cryptographic key that must be shared between the
sender and the recipient. Even though the Vernam cipher offers unconditional security
against adversaries possessing unlimited computational power and technological abili-
ties, it faces the problem of how to securely distribute the key. In 1949, Shannon proved
that the one-time pad is information-theoretically secure, no matter how much computing
power is available to the eavesdropper [11]. That is, if the key is truly random, never
reused and kept secret, the one-time pad provides perfect secrecy (the only crypto-system
with perfect secrecy).
Despite Shannon’s proof of its security, the one-time pad has serious drawbacks in prac-
tice:
• it requires a perfectly random key;
• secure generation and exchange of the key must be at least as long as the message;
One time pads require extremely long keys and are therefore prohibitively expensive in
most applications. These implementation difficulties have led to one-time pad systems
being impractical and are so serious that they have prevented the one-time pad from being
adopted as a widespread tool in information security.
There are two main branches of cryptography: secret (symmetric) key cryptography and
public (asymmetric) key cryptography.
2.2.2 Secret-Key Cryptography
In secret key cryptography, a single common key is used for both encryption and decryp-
tion. As shown in Figure 2.1, the sender uses the key (or some set of rules) to encrypt
the plaintext and sends the ciphertext to the receiver[12]. The receiver applies the same
key to decrypt the message and recover the plaintext. Because a single key is used for
both functions, secret key cryptography is also called symmetric encryption. With this
form of cryptography, it is obvious that the key must be known to both the sender and
the receiver; that, in fact, is the secret. Secure key distribution is the main problem of
secret-key cryptosystems. The security of communications is reduced to the security of
secret-key distribution.
2.2.3 Public-Key Cryptography
A new surge of interest in cryptography was triggered by the upswing in electronic com-
munications in the late 1970. It was essential to enable secure communication between
3The substitution cipher is a well-known classical cipher in which every plaintext character in all its
occurrences in a message is replaced by a unique ciphertext character
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Figure 2.1: Secret Key Cryptography
users who have never met before and share no secret cryptographic key. But the question
was how to distribute the key in a secure way. The solution was found by Whitfield Diffie
and Martin E. Hellman, who invented public-key cryptography in 1976 [13]. The ease
of use of public-key cryptography, in turn, stimulated the boom of electronic commerce
during the 1990s.
Public-key cryptography requires a key pair: the public key and the private key. The
recipient of a message generates two keys, reveals the public key through a trusted au-
thority and keeps his private key in a secret place to ensure its private possession. In this
algorithm anyone can encrypt a message using the public key, however, only the authen-
tic recipient can decrypt the message using his/her private key. Figure 2.2 describes the
Public Key Cryptography[12]
Figure 2.2: public Key Cryptography
Modern public key Cryptography until the mid-1980 was founded on computational
complexity of certain trap-door one-way functions that are easy to compute in one di-
rection, but very difficult in the opposite direction. It is, e.g., very easy to multiply two
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prime numbers, but to factor the product of two large primes is already a difficult task.
Other public-key cryptosystems are based, e.g., on the difficulty of the discrete logarithm
problem in Abelian groups on elliptic curves or other finite groups. To a large extent
computational complexity is still the backbone of modern cryptography, hence, Public-
key cryptography cannot provide unconditional security.
Today the most widely used public-key system is the RSA cryptosystem, invented in 1977
by Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman [14]. RSA exploits the difficulty of
factoring large numbers, it uses a public key N which is the product of two large prime
numbers (called “modulus”). Using this key, anyone can encrypt a message. However, in
order to invert the algorithm it is necessary to know the prime factors of the modulus.
The possible construction of a quantum computer represents a menace to the security of
public-key cryptography. The decryption using a quantum computer would take about the
same time as the encryption, thereby making public-key cryptography worthless. Algo-
rithms capable of doing so have already been developed[15] and first experiments with
small-scale quantum computers successfully pave the way to more sophisticated devices
[16]. For example, one way to crack RSA encryption is by factoring N , but with classi-
cal algorithms, factoring becomes increasingly time consuming as N grows large; more
specifically, there is not any known classical algorithm that can factor N with a complex-
ity O((logN)k) for any k. By contrast, Short’s algorithm can crack RSA in polynomial
time.
2.3 Quantum Cryptography
2.3.1 Introduction
It has been said that the security of conventional cryptographic techniques relies on the
assumption of limited advancement of mathematical algorithms and computational power
in the foreseeable future, and also on limited financial resources available to a potential
adversary. Computationally secure cryptosystems, no matter whether public- or secret-
key, will always be at the mercy of mathematical and/or computational breakthroughs,
which are difficult to predict and may even be hidden. In addition, steady progress in
code-breaking allows the adversary to reach back in time and break older, earlier cap-
tured messages encrypted with weaker keys. As a consequence, periodic re-encryption or
re-signing certain sensitive documents is necessary, along with the requirement to care-
fully sort information according to the used cryptosystem.
Another common problem of conventional cryptographic methods is the so-called side-
channel cryptanalysis. Side channels are undesirable ways through which information
related to the activity of the cryptographic device can leak out. The attacks based on side-
channel information do not assault the mathematical structure of cryptosystems, but their
particular implementations. It is possible to gain information for instance by measuring
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the amount of time needed to perform a certain operation, by measuring power consump-
tion, heat or electromagnetic radiation.
Quantum mechanics offers a solution for the secure key distribution in cryptosystems.
While the security of classical cryptographic methods can be undermined by advances
in technology and mathematical algorithms, the quantum approach can provide uncon-
ditional security. In quantum mechanics the security is guaranteed by the Heisenberg
uncertainty principle, which does not allow us to discriminate non-orthogonal states with
certainty. Within the framework of classical physics, it is impossible to reveal possible
eavesdropping, because information encoded into any property of a classical object can
be obtained without affecting the object itself. All classical signals can be monitored
passively. In classical communications, one bit of information is encoded in billions of
photons, electrons, atoms or other carriers. It is always possible to passively listen in, by
splitting part of the signal and performing a measurement on it. Quantum cryptosystems
eliminate this side channel by encoding each bit of information into an individual quan-
tum object, such as a single photon. Single photons cannot be split, copied or amplified
without introducing detectable disturbances.
It is important to notice that quantum mechanics does not prevent eavesdropping; it only
allows one to detect the presence of a possible eavesdropper. Since only the cryptographic
key is transmitted, no information leakage can take place when someone attempts to listen
in. Eavesdropping causes discrepancies between measurements and when discrepancies
are found, the key is simply discarded and the users may repeat the procedure to generate
a new key.
2.3.2 Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
In the early 1980s, Bennett and Brassard proposed a solution to the key distribution prob-
lem based on quantum physics[17]. They presented a protocol that allows users to es-
tablish an identical and purely random sequence of bits at two different locations, while
revealing any eavesdropping with a very high probability. This idea, independently redis-
covered by Ekert a few years later[18], was the beginning of quantum key distribution,
which was to become the most promising element of quantum cryptography4.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a technology to distribute, or rather generate, secure
random keys between two communicating parties using optical fiber or free-space as a
communication channel. It has been said that QKD has emerged in the last decades as
one of the most important applications of quantum mechanics. Hence, in this paragraph
the basic configuration and elements of such an important application will be introduced.
4For some authors, quantum cryptography and quantum key distribution are synonymous. For others,
however, quantum cryptography also includes other applications of quantum mechanics related to cryptog-
raphy, such as quantum secret sharing or every other possible tasks related to secrecy that are implemented
with the help of quantum physics.
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Alternative introductions to this subject are available in many sources, ranging from books
[19],[20],[21],[22] to other review articles [23],[24],[25].
2.3.2.1 Generalities
The general setting of QKD is shown in Figure 2.3. The two authorized parties, wishing
to share a secret message are traditionally called Alice and Bob. Alice, the sender, is the
one who starts a key transmission, while Bob, the receiver, is the one who receives the
quantum states and extracts the key sent by Alice. This is just a convention used in the
field, but not a strict definition. The third important character is the eavesdropper, Eve,
who is trying to intrude in the QKD and gain information about the key generated by Alice
and Bob. Alice and Bob share a quantum secure channel, on which they send the quan-
tum signals; and a classical public channel, on which they can send classical messages
possibly back and forth. The classical channel needs to be authenticated; this means that
Alice and Bob identify themselves, a third party can listen to the conversation but cannot
participate in it. The quantum channel however, is open to any possible manipulation.
The task of Alice and Bob is that of guaranteeing security against a possible eavesdropper
that taps into the quantum channel and listens to the exchanges on the classical channel.
In order to guarantee the security, either the authorized partners are able to create a secret
key (a common list of secret bits known only to them) or they shall abort the protocol.
Therefore, after the transmission of a sequence of symbols, Alice and Bob must estimate
how much information about their set of bits has leaked out to Eve. In classical commu-
nications, such an estimate is obviously impossible, when Eve listens to the exchanges
on the classical channel the communication goes on unmodified. This is where quantum
physics comes into play: in a quantum channel, the leakage of information is directly
related to the degradation of the communication quality.
Choice of photons (light)
In general, quantum information processing can be implemented with any quantum state
of matter including energy state of ions, atoms, polarization states of light, electron spins,
etc. Abstractly, this is also the case for QKD: one could imagine performing a QKD exper-
iment with electrons, ions, and molecules; however, light is the only practical choice since
it does not interact much with the environment leading to what is called de-coherence. In-
deed, the task of key distribution makes sense only if Alice and Bob are separated by
a macroscopic distance; if they are in the same room, there are much easier ways of
generating a common secret key. Since, at any practical distance of interest, light propa-
gates faster and with smaller de-coherence than matter, photons are the information car-
riers of choice. Various properties of photons can be employed to encode information
for QKD, such as polarization, phase, quantum correlations of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
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Figure 2.3: Quantum key distribution comprises a quantum channel and a public classical
authenticated channel. As a universal convention in quantum cryptography, Alice sends
quantum states to Bob through a quantum channel. Eve is suspected of eavesdropping on
the line.
(EPR) pairs, and wavelength or quadrature components of squeezed states of light. It is
also well known that light does not interact easily with matter.
The way losses affect QKD varies with the type of protocol and its implementation.
Losses impose bounds on the secret key rate and on the achievable distance and may
also leak information to the eavesdropper, according to the nature of the quantum signal
(for coherent pulses this is certainly the case while for single photons it is not). Another
difference is determined by the detection scheme. Implementations that use photon coun-
ters rely on post-selection. If a photon does not arrive, the detector does not click and the
event is simply discarded. On the contrary, implementations that use homodyne detec-
tion always give a signal, therefore losses translate into additional noise. QKD is always
implemented with light and there is no reason to believe that things will change in the
future. As a consequence, the quantum channel is any medium that propagates light with
acceptable losses, typically either an optical fiber or just free space, provided a line of
sight path exists between Alice and Bob.
2.3.2.2 The BB84 Protocol
The first and probably most famous QKD protocol is the so-called BB84 protocol, which
can help one to understand the basic QKD concepts. Suppose Alice holds a source of
single photons. The spectral properties of the photons are sharply defined, so that the
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only degree of freedom left is the polarization5. Alice and Bob align their polarizers6 and
agree to use either the horizontal or vertical (+) basis (rectilinear), or the complementary
basis of linear polarizations, i.e., +45/− 45 degrees (×) (diagonal). The transmitted bits
are “prepared” at the transmitter (using the states of the selected basis) and “measured” at
the receiver.
Specifically, the bits are encoded as follows:
|H〉 → 0+ |+45〉 → 0×
|V 〉 → 1+ |−45〉 → 1×
where both bit values 0 and 1, are encoded in two possible ways in non-orthogonal
states, since |±45〉 = √2/2(|H〉 ± |V 〉) It is important to notice that these four states
satisfy the following relations:
〈H |V 〉 = 〈−45 |+45〉 = 0 (2.1)
〈H |H〉 = 〈V |V 〉 = 〈+45 |+45〉 = 〈−45 | −45〉 = 1 (2.2)
〈H | ±45〉2 = 〈V | ±45〉2 = 1/2 (2.3)
The theory of quantum-mechanics states that:
• Measurements performed in the basis identical to the basis of preparation of states
will produce deterministic results (Equation 2.1 and Equation 2.2);
• Any measurements in the diagonal basis on photons prepared in the rectilinear basis
will yield random outcomes with equal probabilities and vice-versa (Equation 2.3);
Once Alice and Bob have agreed on the coding, the BB84 protocol can be summarized
by the following steps:
1. Key Transmission: Alice, the sender, generates a sequence of N random bits for
transmission and chooses the encoding basis (rectilinear or diagonal) in a random
and independent way for each bit. Physically this means that she transmits photons
in the four polarization states shown in Figure 2.5 equally frequently. Bob, the
receiver, randomly and independently of Alice, chooses his measurement basis,
either rectilinear or diagonal. Statistically, Alice and Bob’s bases match in 50% of
the cases. At the end of this stage Alice and Bob will share what is called the raw
key.
5Usually the way to encode the information being sent over the quantum channel is through the trans-
mission of photons in some polarization states. The direction of the polarization encodes a classical bit.
6A polarizer is an optical filter that passes light of a specific polarization and blocks waves of other
polarizations.
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Figure 2.4: The four states of the BB84 Protocol.
2. Basis Announcement: Alice and Bob communicate over the classical channel and
compare the basis used for each transmitted and detected photon. Whenever their
bases coincide, Alice and Bob keep the bit whereupon it becomes part of the cryp-
tographic key after reconciliation and privacy amplification. The bit is discarded
when they chose different basis, when Bob’s detector fails to register a photon due
to the imperfect efficiency of detectors, or when the photon was lost somewhere
along the way. Any potential eavesdropper, can only learn if Alice and Bob chose
the same basis, but cannot determine whether Alice originally sent a “0” or “1”.
This step is called sifting. At the end, Alice and Bob have a string of bits of approx-
imatelyN/2 bits, called the sifted key.
3. Error Estimation: Alice and Bob disclose part of their strings, a subset of the
bits of size K, and estimate the error rate in the quantum channel. If Eve tries to
eavesdrop on the quantum channel, she cannot passively monitor the transmissions.
Instead she can intercept the photons sent by Alice, perform measurements on them
and resend them. However, since Alice had chosen her encoding bases randomly
Eve has to guess. Half the times Eve will guess the basis right and resend correctly
polarized photons, while in the other 50% of the cases, she measures in the wrong
basis, producing errors. When Alice and Bob reveal a random sample of the bits
of their raw keys, they discover these errors. Alice and Bob use a predetermined
“failure” error threshold (emax) to decide whether or not an eavesdropper is present.
In the literature, the most common failure error rate chosen is greater than or equal
to 0.15 [50]. At 0.15 error rate, an eavesdropper could have intercepted over half
of the bits transmitted. Both Alice and Bob compute the observed error-rate e and
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Figure 2.5: The BB84 Protocol.
accept the quantum transmission if e < emax. In this case they remove the K bits
announced from the raw key. Otherwise if e > emax Eve is suspected of tampering
with the channel, and the cryptographic key is thrown away. Thus, no informa-
tion leak occurs even in the case of eavesdropping. It should be mentioned that
no physical apparatus is perfect and noiseless. Alice and Bob will always find dis-
crepancies, even in the absence of Eve. As they cannot tell errors stemming from
eavesdropping from the noise of the apparatus, they conservatively attribute all the
errors in transmissions to Eve. The actual error rate stems from both noise in the
channel and possibly, interference from an eavesdropper.
4. Reconciliation and Privacy Amplification: If there are errors however, Alice and
Bob have to correct them and have to eliminate the information that could have been
obtained by Eve. Information reconciliation is a form of error correction carried out
on Alice and Bob’s keys, in order to ensure both keys are identical. It is conducted
over the public channel and as such it is vital to minimize the information sent about
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each key, since any such information is totally accessible by Eve. In the earlier ver-
sions of the complete protocol, Alice and Bob perform the error correction through
an interactive reconciliation protocol called Cascade. This is a simple protocol that
leaks an amount of information close to the theoretical bound of an almost ideal
protocol, when the error probability is below 15%. Cascade was presented in [51]
as an improvement of the procedure suggested in [52].Cascade operates in several
rounds. During each round, Alice and Bob divide their raw keys into blocks, and
disclose the parity of each block and compare them. If the parity bits do not match
then a binary search is performed in order to find and correct the error. After all
blocks have been compared, Alice and Bob both reorder their keys in the same ran-
dom way, and a new round begins. If an error is found in a block from a previous
round that had correct parity then another error must be contained in that block; this
error is found and corrected as before. This process is repeated recursively, which
is the origin of the name cascade. At the end of multiple rounds, Alice and Bob
have identical keys with high probability, however Eve has additional information
about the key from the parity information exchanged.
Once the Information reconciliation has been performed, Alice and Bob share what
is known as the reconciled key. Privacy amplification is a method for reducing (and
effectively eliminating) Eve’s partial information about Alice and Bob’s key. This par-
tial information could have been gained both by eavesdropping on the quantum channel
during key transmission (thus introducing detectable errors), and on the public channel
during information reconciliation (where it is assumed Eve has access to all the parity in-
formation). Privacy amplification uses Alice and Bob’s key to produce a new, condensed
key, in such a way that Eve’s amount of information about the new key is negligible. This
can be done using universal hashing functions, chosen randomly from a publicly known
set. The size r of the secret key that Alice and Bob can distill depends on the kind, as
well as the amount, of information available to Eve. It is important to notice that the final
distilled key has a very short length when compared to the initial key size, as shown in
Figure 2.6.
From the description of the BB84 protocol, it can be observed that, although the secu-
rity of QKD relies on the laws of quantum mechanics, a considerable part of the protocol
utilizes the classical communication channel and classical techniques exclusively. Once
the raw key has been transmitted over the quantum channel, a secret key is distilled using
classic post-processing techniques that require interaction. In the process, some informa-
tion about the key is exchanged via the public channel in order to correct the errors and
eliminate the possible information that Eve may have derived. Information reconciliation
is a mechanism that allows for elimination of the discrepancies between two correlated
variables. It is an essential component in every key agreement protocol where the key has
to be transmitted through a noisy channel. Hence, it is important to explore other classical
techniques in the context of QKD systems, to minimize the information exchanged over
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Figure 2.6: Distillation process and key length in BB84 Protocol.
the public channel so jeopardizing the provable security that quantum physics guarantees
can be avoided.
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Chapter 3
Capacity achieving Codes
A communication system is generally designed for the transmission of data reliably over
a noisy channel. Channel encoding and decoding are very important in a communication
system with a noisy channel. The channel encoder adds redundancy to the data for the
reliable communication over a noisy channel. The channel decoder reproduces the data
sent over the channel from the channel output. In this chapter we will describe some
channel codes that are believed to be capacity approaching and capacity achieving for
certain channels.
3.1 Preliminaries
3.1.1 Shannon’s noisy channel coding theorem
In 1948, Claude E. Shannon published his seminal paper [26] on the mathematical the-
ory of communication, which gave birth to information theory. In this paper, Shannon
presented and formalized the concept of information, and substantiated the limits of max-
imum amount of reliable information transfer over unreliable channels. This theorem
establishes that it is possible to communicate digital information almost error-free up to
a computable maximum rate, over a communication channel with any given degree of
noise.
The Shannon capacity of a communication channel with a certain level of noise is the the-
oretical maximum information transfer rate of the channel. Shannon proved that reliable
transmission is possible for rates below the capacity, and is not possible for rates above
capacity. The whim of capacity is defined purely in terms of information theory. As such
it does not guarantee the existence of transmission schemes that achieve the capacity.
The theorem describes the maximum possible efficiency of error-correcting methods ver-
sus levels of noise, interference and data corruption.
21
3 – Capacity achieving Codes
The Shannon theorem states that given a noisy channel with channel capacity C and infor-
mation transmitted at a rate R, then if R < C there exist codes that allow the probability
of error at the receiver to be made arbitrarily small.
On the contrary, if R > C, all codes will have a probability of error greater than a certain
positive minimal level (that increases as the rate increases). So, information cannot be
guaranteed to be transmitted reliably across a channel at rates beyond the channel capac-
ity. The theorem does not address the rare situation in which rate and capacity are equal.
Shannon also introduced the concept of codes as (finite) sets of vectors over the input
alphabet, which is to be transmitted. To achieve reliable communication, it is impera-
tive to send input elements that are correlated. We assume that all the vectors have the
same length, and call this length the block length of the code. If the number of vectors is
K = 2k then every vector can be described with k-bits. If the length of the vectors is n,
then in n times use of the channel k-bits have been transmitted. We say then that the code
has a rate of Rc =
k
n
bits per channel use.
Let suppose that a codeword is sent, and a vector over the output alphabet is received. If
the channel is lossy and allows for error, then in general it cannot be said with absolute
certainty which codeword was sent. However, the most likely codeword that was sent can
be found, in the sense that the probability that this codeword was sent given the observed
vector is maximized. To find such a codeword, we can simply list all the K codewords,
and calculate the conditional probability for the individual codewords. We can then find
the vector or vectors that yield the maximum probability and return one of them. This
decoder is called the maximum likelihood decoder.
Shannon proved the existence of codes with rates arbitrarily close to capacity for which
the probability of error of the maximum likelihood decoder goes to zero as the block
length of the code goes to infinity.
Codes that approach the capacity of the channel are good from a communication point
of view. However, along with achieving capacity, if these codes are to be used for com-
munication, fast algorithms for encoding and decoding are needed. In the sections below,
Low Density Parity Check codes (LDPC) and Polar codes that approach the capacity of
the channel will be described.
3.1.2 Binary Discrete Memoryless Channel (B-DMC)
A channel is mathematically defined as a set of possible inputs to the channel X , a set of
possible outputs to the channel Y , and a conditional probability distribution P (y|x). The
simplest class of channels is discrete memoryless channels (DMC).
In information theory symmetric B-DMCs are an important class of channels defined
as: Definition. A symmetric binary discrete memoryless channel (B-DMC) is a B-DMC
W : {0,1} → Y with the additional property that there exists a permutation over the
outputs of the channel π : Y → Y such that π = π − 1 and P (y|0) = P (π (y) |1).
An important example of B-DMCs is binary symmetric channels (BSC).
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3.1.2.1 Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC)
A BSC is a kind of communication channel with binary inputs and outputs respectively. A
probability p is associated with BSC is called the crossover probability. This means, with
a probability p, a bit sent through the BSC is flipped. And conversely with a probability
1 − p a bit sent through the BSC passes unchanged. The pictorial description is given in
Figure 3.1
Figure 3.1: Binary Symmetric Channel with crossover probability p
3.1.2.2 Mutual Information and Bhattacharyya parameter
The two important parameters of symmetric B-DMC’s are defined as:
• Mutula Information: The mutual information of a B-DMCwith input alphabetX =
{0,1} is given as:
I (W ) ,
1
2
∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈X
W (y|x) log W (y|x)1
2
W (y|0) + 1
2
W (y|1) (3.1)
I (W ) is the measure of the rate of a channel. For a symmetric B-DMC reliable
communication is possible at any rates up to I(W).
• Bhattacharyya Parameter: The Bhattacharyya parameter is defined as:
Z (W ) ,
∑
y∈Y
√
W (y|0)W (y|1) (3.2)
Z(W ) is an upper bound on the probability of maximum-likelihood (ML) decision
error for uncoded transmission overW , Hence it is the measure of reliability if the
channel.
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3.2 Low Density Parity Check (LDPC) Codes
This section describes the characteristics of a class of capacity achieving block codes, the
Low-Density Parity-Check (LDPC) codes. LDPC codes are a class of linear block codes
whose name comes from the characteristic of their parity-check matrix which contains
few ones in comparison to the number of zeros. Their main advantage is that they provide
a performance which is very close to the capacity for a lot of different channels and there
are linear time complexity decoding algorithms available for them. Furthermore, they
are suited for implementations that make heavy use of parallelism. LDPC codes can be
represented through a matrix as well as a graph.
3.2.1 Matrix representation
An (n,k) LDPC code is represented by a parity check matrix which consists ofm = n−k
rows and n columns, where n is the codeword length, k the number of information bits
andm the number of redundant bits. For example, the matrix defined in Equation 3.3 is a
parity check matrixH with dimension n× k for a (8,4) LDPC code.
H =


0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0

 (3.3)
We can define two numbers describing the matrixH , wr, that indicates the number of 1’s
in each row and wc that indicates the number of 1’s in each column. For a matrix to be
called low-density the two conditions wc ≪ n and wr ≪ m must be satisfied. In order to
achieve this, the parity check matrix should usually be very large (so the example matrix
presented above is not really low-density).
3.2.2 Graphical representation
In a Tanner Graph representation of a (n,k) LDPC code, the n nodes related to the rows
of the parity check matrix are denoted as Variable Nodes or Bit Nodes (V-nodes). On the
other hand there are m nodes, called Check Nodes (C-nodes), that are related to the rows
of the H matrix, i.e., the m parity check equations of the code. An edge on the Tanner
Graph connects a V-node to a C-node only if the corresponding element is a “1” in the
parity check matrix H . From the parity check matrix H of Equation 3.3, we have n = 8
V-nodes connected tom = 4 C-nodes. Figure 3.2 shows the Tanner graph representation
of the parity check matrix of Equation 3.3. Notice that the bit nodes values connected
to same check node must sum to zero. Similarly, a Tanner graph can also be constructed
from the columns of H .
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Figure 3.2: Tanner Graph representation of the LDPC code corresponding to the parity
check
In a Tanner graph like the one in Figure 3.2 it is possible to identify close cycles. The
marked path c2 → f1 → c5 → f2 → c2 is an example of a short cycle. Those should
usually be avoided since they are bad for decoding performance.
3.2.3 Encoding
In an (n,k) LDPC code, if the rank of the H matrix is r, then n − r information bits can
be transmitted per codeword. Accordingly the code rate is given by,
Rc = k/n = (n−m)/n ≤ (n− r)/n (3.4)
where the inequality holds when allm rows are linearly independent.
LDPC codes are encoded using the generator matrix G spanning a space which is the
orthogonal complement of the space spanned by the parity-check matrixH , so that
GHT = 0. (3.5)
G and H can be derived from each other using Gaussian elimination. If the code is
systematic, the matrixH can be expressed as,
H =
[
In−k|P
]
(3.6)
where I is a (n− k)× (n− k) identity matrix and P is the (n− k)× k parity matrix.
The generator-matrix G can be written in the systematic form as
H =
[
P T |Ik
]
(3.7)
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where represents the k × (n− k) transposed parity matrix. If we consider a sequence
of information bits x that contains k bits, the encoding process is achieved by simply
multiplying this sequence by the generator matrix to get the codeword,
C = xG (3.8)
3.2.4 Decoding
The iterative decoding algorithm used for LDPC codes is well known as the Sum Product
Algorithm (SPA), Belief Propagation Algorithm (BPA) or Message Passing Algorithm
(MPA). The term message passing refers to the fact that during each round messages in
the form of probabilities (or beliefs) are passed from V-nodes to C-nodes and vice versa.
An important aspect of iterative decoding is that message to be sent from the ith V-node Vi
to the jth C-node Cj must not take into account the message sent in the previous iteration
from Cj to Vi. The same rule holds for messages to be sent from Cj to Vi.
The Belief Propagation Algorithms (BPA) is an important class of message passing algo-
rithm where the messages passed along the edges of a Tanner Graph are probabilities (or
beliefs) [27]. More precisely, the message passed from the V-node Vi to the C-node Cj is
the probability that Vi has a certain value, given its own noisy observed value, and all the
values received in the previous iteration from its neighboring C-nodes (two nodes are said
to be neighbors if they are connected to the same edge of Tanner graph) excluding Cj .
Similarly, the message passed from Cj to Vi is the probability that Vi has a certain value
given all the messages passed to Cj in the previous iteration from neighboring V-nodes
other than Vi.
The aim of the belief propagation algorithm is to compute the A-Posteriori Probability
(APP) that a given bit in the transmitted code-word C = [c0c1...cn−1] equals 1, given the
received sufficient statistic samples Y = [y0y1...yn−1], i.e., the APP probability
pi = Pr (ci = 1|Y ) (3.9)
or the APP ratio (also called Likelihood Ratio (LR)),
l(ci) =
Pr(ci = 0|Y ))
Pr(ci = 1|Y ) (3.10)
The LR can be iteratively computed exploiting the code’s Tanner graph. In one half
iteration, each V-node processes its input messages (probabilities or LLRs) and passes
its resulting output messages to the neighboring C-nodes. In the other half iteration the
C-node passes its messages to the V-nodes. After a pre-defined number of iterations, or
after some stopping criteria have been met, the decoder computes the APP (A-Posteriori
Probabilities), or LLR (Log Likelihood Ratios) from which decisions on the bits can be
taken.
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Let fkij and g
k
ji be the messages from Vi to Cj and Cj to Vi in k
th iteration, respectively.
The belief propagation algorithm in probability domain can be described as,
1. Initialization:
f 0ij (0) = 1− pi (3.11)
f 0ij (1) = pi (3.12)
2. C-node update:
gkji(0) = 1/2 + 1/2Πi∈fj/i
(
1− 2f (k−1)ij (1)
)
(3.13)
where f(j/i) is the set of all V-nodes connected to Cj excluding Vi, and,
gkji(1) = 1− gkji(0) (3.14)
3. V-node update:
fkij(0) = 1−Aijf 0ijΠj∈gi/jgkji(0) (3.15)
where g(i/j) is the set of all C-nodes connected to Vi excluding Cj , and,
fkij(1) = Aijf
0
ij(1)Πj∈gi/jg
k
ji(1) (3.16)
where Aij are constants, which satisfy
fkij(0) + f
k
ij(1) = 1 (3.17)
4. Soft Decision:
F ki (0) = Aif
0
ij(0)Πj∈gig
k
ji(0) (3.18)
F ki (1) = Aif
0
ij(1)Πj∈gig
k
ji(1) (3.19)
where gi is the set of all C-nodes connected to Vi, and Ai is chosen to satisfy,
F ki (0) + F
k
i (1) = 1 (3.20)
27
3 – Capacity achieving Codes
5. Hard Decision:
c˜ (i) =
{
1, ifF ki ≫ 0
0, otherwise
If c˜HT = 0, or maximum number of iterations is reached, stop, else go back to step
2), where c˜ is the decoded codeword.
As it can be seen above, the decoding process involves the multiplication of probabilities,
which have high computational complexity. With the increase in number of iterations a
log domain manipulation is required to decrease the complexity, by converting multipli-
cations to additions.
In log domain the algorithm can be described as follows, first we define:
L(ci) = log
Pr(ci = 0|Y )
Pr(ci = 1|Y ) (3.21)
L(fij) = log
fij(0)
fij(1)
(3.22)
L(gij) = log
gij(0)
gij(1)
(3.23)
L(Fi) = log
Fi(0)
Fi(1)
(3.24)
1. Initialization:
L0(fij) = L
0(ci) (3.25)
2. C-node update: From equation 3.13 and 3.14 we get
1− 2gji(1) = Πi∈fj/i (1− 2fij(1)) (3.26)
Now since tanh[1
2
log(a
b
)] = 1 − 2b and using equation 3.22 and 3.23, 3.26 can be
written as,
tanh
[
1
2
Lk(gij)
]
= Πi∈ fj/itanh
[
1
2
L(k−1)(fij)
]
(3.27)
Equation (3.27) still involves multiplication and a complex tanh(.) function that
needs to be simplified. Let us represent L(fi) in its sign and magnitude form; in
particular, let Θij represent the sign of L(fij), and δij represent the magnitude of
L(fij). Using these, equation 3.27 becomes,
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tanh
[
1
2
Lk(gij)
]
= Πi∈ fj/iΘ
(k−1)
ij .Πi∈fj/itanh
[
1
2
δ
(k−1)
ij
]
(3.28)
Then,
Lk(gij) = Πi∈fj/iΘ
(k−1)
ij .2tanh
−1.log−1.log
[
Πi∈fj/itanh
[
1
2
δ
(k−1)
ij
]]
(3.29)
= Πi∈fj/iΘ
(k−1)
ij .2tanh
−1.log−1.
∑
i∈fj/i
log
[
tanh
[
1
2
δ
(k−1)
ij
]]
(3.30)
Let γ be a map from the real numbers [−∞,∞] to F2× [0,∞] defined by γ(x) :=
(sgn(x)− log(tanh((|x|)/2))), whereby,
sgn (x) =
{
1, if x ≥ 1
0, otherwise
Equation (3.30) can be written as,
Lk(gij) = γ
−1

∑
i∈fj/i
γ
(
δ
(k−1)
ij
) (3.31)
3. V-node update: Dividing equation 3.16 by 3.15 and taking log, we have,
Lk(fij) = L
0(ci) +
∑
j∈gi/j
Lk(gji) (3.32)
4. Soft Decision:
L(Fij) = L
0(ci) +
∑
j∈gi
L(gji) (3.33)
5. Hard decision:
c˜ (i) =
{
1, ifLki < 0
0, otherwise
If c˜HT = 0, or maximum number of iterations is reached, stop, else go back to step
2), where c˜ is the decoded codeword.
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3.2.5 Density Evaluation (DE)
As stated previously, the asymptotic performance of LDPC codes, when the codeword
length tends to infinity, has been studied using an analytical technique called density evo-
lution (DE) or Gaussian approximation [27],[28],[29].
The density evolution computes the probability density function (PDF) of the messages
defined by the message-passing algorithm on Tanner graphs at any iteration. From [31],
“Asymptotically, the actual density of the messages passed is very close to the expected
density. Tracking the expected density during the iterations thus gives a very good picture
of the actual behavior of the algorithm[28]”. Two assumptions are made for the calcula-
tion of density evolution [29],
• The independence condition assures that the messages passed on the Tanner graph
are statistically independent;
• For infinite code length, the factor graph can be viewed as a cycle free graph.
In general, an LDPC code ensemble is specified by a degree profile (λ,ρ). Its cor-
responding generating functions are λ(x) =
∑dvmax
i=2 λix
i−1 and ρ(x) =
∑dcmax
i=2 ρix
i−1
where λi(ρi) is the fraction of edges with variable (check) node of degree i and dvmax
(dcmax) is the maximal variable (check) node degree (number of edges connected to it),
respectively.
Let ςck denote the common density function of the messages g
k
ji sent from C-nodes to
V-nodes at round k and let ς denote the density of the messages f 0ij , i.e., the likelihood of
the messages sent at iteration 0 of the algorithm. Then the update rule for the densities in
equation 3.31 implies that the common density ςvk+1 of the messages sent from V-nodes
to C-nodes at round k+1 conditioned on the event that the degree of the node is d, equals
ς ∗ ς(d−1)ck , where (ς ∗ ςck)(τ) =
∫
(ς(σ)ςck(τ − σ))dτ is the convolution over some group
G0 of ς andςck [29]. Using γ(x) defined above, let Γ (γ(x)) be the density of γ(x). Using
equation 3.31 and the independence assumption, it can be shown that
ςck = Γ
−1(ρ(Γ (ςvk))) (3.34)
where Γ is the Laplace transform of the expected densities derived in[28],[29]. From
this, the following recursion formula can be obtained for density evolution (DE):
ςvk+1 = ς ∗ λ(Γ−1(ρ(Γ (ςvk)))) (3.35)
The convolution can be efficiently computed using Fourier transform F , so the DE
can be expressed as
ςvk+1 = ΓF−1(F(ς)λ(F(ςck))) (3.36)
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From density evolution together with Fourier transform techniques, asymptotic thresh-
olds below which belief propagation decodes the code successfully, and above which be-
lief propagation does not decode successfully, can be derived [27],[28],[29].
The asymptotic performance of LDPC is characterized by finding the maximum channel
parameter (threshold σ∗) such that if σ < σ∗ then limk→∞ P ke = 0,and P
k
e is the expected
fraction of incorrect messages at the kth iteration.
3.3 Polar Codes
Polar codes were introduced by Arkan in [30]. Polar codes are linear block codes which
provably achieve the capacity of symmetric B-DMC’s.
Polar codes uses the concept of channel polarization described below. The idea of polar
codes is to create from N independent copies of a B-DMC W through a linear trans-
formation, another N different channels
{
W
(i)
N : 1 ≤ i ≤ N
}
, such that as N grows
large these synthesized channels are polarized. i.e., their mutual information are close
to either 0 or 1. It is shown that the fraction of indices i for which I
(
W
(i)
N
)
is close to
1 is I (W ), and the fraction of indices i for which I
(
W
(i)
N
)
is close to 0 is 1 − I (W )
asymptotically. Hence some channel becomes good and some channels become worst.
The encoding/decoding complexity of the codes is O (NlogN).
3.3.1 Channel Polarization
Channel polarization is an operation which produces N channels
{
W
(i)
N : 1 ≤ i ≤ N
}
,
fromN independent copies of a B-DMCW such that the new channels are synthesized in
the sense that their mutual information is either close to 0 (Bad, noisy channels) or close
to 1 (good, noiseless channels). Channel polarization consists of two phases [30],[31],
1. Channel Combining: In channel combining phase, a recursive mechanism is ap-
plied to combine copies of a B-DMC in n steps to form a vector channelWN , where
N = 2n. The channel combining can be described through the following transfor-
mation:
W2 (y1,y2|u1,u2) = W (y1|u1 ⊕ u2)W (y2|u2) (3.37)
it can be seen from Equation 3.37 that a new vector channel of size 2 is created
from combining two separate channels i.e., W2 : {0,1}2 → Y 2. Since the linear
transformation between (U1,U2) is a one-to-one mapping:
I (U1,U2; Y1,Y2) = I (X1,X2; Y1,Y2) = 2I (W ) (3.38)
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Figure 3.3: Channel Combining
For a general N = 2n channel combining can be done as:
WN
(
Y N |UN) = WN/2 (Y N/2|UNo ⊕ UNe )WN/2 (Y NN/2+1|UNe ) (3.39)
whereWN = {W1,W2,...,WN}, UNo = {u1,u3,...,uN}, UNe = {u2,u4,...,uN}.
2. Channel Splitting: In channel splitting, WN is split back into N channels W
(i)
N :
{0,1} → Y N × {0,1}i−1 ,1 ≤ i ≤ N .
Equation 3.38 can be written using chain rule as:
I (U1,U2; Y1,Y2) = I (U1; Y1,Y2) + I (U2; Y1,Y2,U1) (3.40)
I (U1; Y1,Y2) is the mutual information of the channel between U1 and Y1,Y2, with
U2 considered as noise. I (U2; Y1,Y2,U1) is the mutual information of the channel
between U2 and Y1,Y2 given that U1 is known [31]. Let the two splitted channel be
denoted asW− andW+, their transition probabilities can be expressed as:
W− (y1,y2|u1) = 1
2
∑
u2∈{0,1}
W (y1|u1 ⊕ u2)W (y2|u2) (3.41)
W+ (y1,y2,u1|u2) = 1
2
W (y1|u1 ⊕ u2)W (y2|u2) (3.42)
The two splitted channels have the following properties[30]:
(a)
I
(
W+
)
+ I
(
W−
)
= 2I (W ) (3.43)
(b)
Z
(
W−
) ≤ 2Z (W )− Z (W )2 (3.44)
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(c)
Z
(
W+
)
= Z (W )2 (3.45)
I
(
W+
)
+ I
(
W−
)
= 2I (W ) (3.46)
This way, the channel is splitted into the channel set {W+,W−}. As U2 is consid-
ered as noise, theW+ is set to be the error-free channel, whileW− is noisy.
For N = 2n the splitting can be done through:
W iN
(
yN1 ,u
i−1
1 |ui
)
,
∑
uNi+1→XN−1
1
2N−1
WN
(
yN1 |uN1
)
(3.47)
In this way the channel combined in the first phase (WN : U
N → Y N ), is splitted
into the polarized channel set W iN : 1 ≤ i ≤ N with the transition probability of
Equation 3.47.
After splitting the channelW iN in the set has input U
i and output (yN1 ,u
i−1
1 ) with the
form: W iN : U → Y N ×X i−1
3.3.2 Encoding
Polar codes are linear codes, i.e., any linear combination of codewords is another code-
word of the code. The polar transform is to apply the transform G⊗n2 , the n
th Kronecker
power to the block of N = 2n bits U.
G2 =
[
1 0
1 1
]
(3.48)
For code length N = 2n , n = 1,2, , and information length K, the code rate is Rc =
K/N .
A binary source block uN1 which consists of K information bits and NK frozen bits
1 is
mapped to a code block xN1 via via x
N
1 = u
N
1 GN . The matrix GN = RNG
⊗n
2 , where
G2 is defined in Equation 3.48, and RN is the bit-reversal permutation matrix. The binary
channel xN are then sent into channels which are obtained by N independent uses ofW
[30],[32].
1 For the transmission of a K bits binary message block , the K most reliable polarized channelsW
(i)
N
with indices i ∈ I are picked out for carrying information bits; and transmit a fixed bit sequence called
frozen bits over the others. The index set I ∈ {1,2,,N} is called information set and |I| = K . And the
complement set of I is called frozen set and is denoted by F .
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3.3.3 Decoding
Arikan mentioned in [30] that, Polar codes can be decoded using successive cancellation
(SC) decoding algorithm. Let u˜N1 denote the estimate of the information block u
N
1 . After
receiving the output yn1 the bits u˜i are determined successively with i = 1,2,...N as:
u˜i =
{
Li
(
yN1 ,u˜
i−1
1
)
if i ∈ I
ui if i ∈ F
where
Li
(
yN1 ,u˜
i−1
1
)
=

0 if
W
(i)
N (yN1 ,u˜
i−1
1 |0)
W
(i)
N (yN1 ,u˜
i−1
1 |0)
≥ 1
1 otherwise
The block error rate (BLER) of this SC decoding is upper bounded by
PSC (N,I) ≤
∑
i∈I
Pe
(
W
(i)
N
)
(3.49)
For more details and proofs about polar codes see [30].
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Chapter 4
Soft-Metric based decision in QKD and
Poisson photons channels
4.1 Overview and System Model
In chapter 2 an overview of weak energy optical communication and QKD systems has
been given. Since the number of photons in all the optical communication scenarios dis-
cussed so far is quite low, either at the transmitter or at the receiver, because of the extreme
conditions or the security constraints, the receiver needs to be very sensitive, and the in-
formation it collects needs to be carefully processed. Single photon detectors can provide
the required sensitivity [2].
In binary optical communication, the logical information is encoded onto two different
states of the radiation field. After the propagation, the receiver should perform a mea-
surement, aimed at discriminating the two states. Currently, most of the long-distance
amplification-free optical classical communication schemes employ relatively weak laser
sources with small mean photon count at the receiver. The same is true for quantum-
enhanced secure cryptographic protocols.
In fact, laser radiation, which is described by coherent states, preserves its fundamental
properties also in presence of losses. On the other hand, operating in the regime of low
number of detected photons gives rise to the problem of discriminating the signals by
quantum-limited measurements [33, 34]. Indeed, the binary discrimination problem for
coherent states has been thoroughly investigated, both for its fundamental interest and for
practical purposes [35], [36], [37], [38], [39], [40].
It should be mentioned however that in order to exploit the phase properties of coherent
states, one should implement phase sensitive receivers [41, 42] with nearly optimal per-
formances also in presence of dissipation and noise [38], [43]. This is a challenging task,
since it is generally difficult, and sometimes impossible, to have a suitable phase reference
in order to implement this kind of detection scheme.
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The simplest choice for a detection scheme involving radiation is given by direct mea-
surements through energy detectors, namely detectors which only detect the presence or
the absence of radiation (on/off detectors) with acceptable dark count rates and detector
dead-times. A natural step forward in the evolution of such schemes would be to employ
photon counting detectors at the receiver.
The first QKD protocols were based on interactive error correction schemes [50], [51],
[52] (like the Cascade algorithm), specially because BB84-like schemes are based on a
highly interactive process that requires many communication rounds. BB84-like protocols
for error correction and information reconciliation in QKD systems are not very efficient
in terms of throughput (distilled key per second) since a lot of information is discarded to
ensure that the information Eve can possibly know is canceled from the final secret key.
More recently Forward Error Correction (FEC) schemes have been suggested [53], [53],
[54], [55],[56], which can avoid re-transmission, increasing the system efficiency, and
must be decoded by decoders exploiting the information available at the output of both
the quantum and the public channel. In practice, the FEC block code must operate on an
equivalent composite parallel channel formed by the quantum and the public channels, as
shown in Figure 4.1, where the k information bits (the sifted key) are transmitted over
the quantum private channel, while the m = n − k redundancy bits are transmitted over
the classical public channel. The eavesdropping on the secure channel in Figure 4.1 is
shown as a dotted line, because if the system is properly designed and the channel QBER
is periodically monitored, the presence of Eve can be detected, as previously described,
and the information leaked to Eve can be made arbitrarily small, as if the eavesdropper
did not exist. Given this hypothesis, we will from now on focus on the overall channel
model linking Alice to Bob, neglecting the presence of Eve.
It is in this scenario that modern Forward Error Correction (FEC) schemes may offer
an interesting solution. The idea is to make use of FECs inherent advantage of requiring
a single channel use to reconcile the set of transmitted and received bits (”qubits” in the
case of QKD).
Since extremely low residual Bit Error Rate (BER) must be achieved (theoretically, error
free decoding is needed), capacity achieving codes with acceptable decoding complexities
and with very long code-length n have been considered in the information reconciliation
literature. LDPC codes constitute a possible interesting option. Furthermore, in order to
minimize the quantity of information derived by Eve from the public channel, the code
rate Rc = k/n must be maximized, and it must be larger than 0.5. The description of
the appropriate models for all the involved channels in Figure 4.1 (and in particular, the
private and the public channels) will be given in the next sections.
In Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and high-photon efficiency optical communications
with direct detection, the transmission channel is typically modeled either as a Binary
Symmetric Channel (BSC), or a Poisson Photon Channel (PPC) [55] with binary input,
and the sufficient statistic at the channel output is typically obtained with a simple hard
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Figure 4.1: System model in a QKD system.
decision on the received random variable. The availability of public side-channel informa-
tion typical of QKD applications, or the multilevel characteristic of the Poissonian output
of weak-energy optical links may however allow the use of soft metrics and of soft-metric-
based iteratively decoded error correcting codes, which may be useful to counteract the
channel errors typical of such low-energy channels.
In this chapter we will show how soft-metric based metrics can be obtained in the consid-
ered scenarios [55], and how capacity achieving Forward Error Correcting (FEC) codes
can be employed over QKD and Poisson cannels. Furthermore, the possible application of
soft-metrics to information reconciliation protocols is discussed, with the goal of design-
ing QKD protocols able to take advantage of the available soft-information. In particular,
the use of FEC codes for information reconciliation could lead to QKD protocols able
to minimize the interaction between transmitter (Alice) and receiver (Bob), allowing for
higher quantum rates.
4.2 Information Reconciliation
The problem of information reconciliation in QKD schemes can be seen as the source
coding problem with side information, as shown in Figure 4.2. Let X and Y be two
of correlated variables belonging to Alice and Bob, and x and y their outcome strings,
through information reconciliation it is possible to eliminate the discrepancies between x
and y and agree on a string S (x), with possibly S (x) = x.
Thus, as shown by Slepian and Wolf [57], the minimum information I that Alice
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Figure 4.2: Source coding with side information.
would have to send to Bob in order to help him reconcile Y and X is Iopt = H (X|Y ).
Taking into account that real reconciliation will not be optimal, a parameter f > 1 is used
as a quality figure for the reconciliation efficiency:
Ireal = fH (X|Y ) > Iopt
4.3 Soft Metric Based QKD protocol
In any QKD scheme in general, Alice wants to transmit a plaintext message secretly to
the receiver Bob. The secret key that will be later used for encryption is transmitted on
a secure private (quantum) channel, which is secure because of the quantum mechanical
properties. But the quantum channel may have a non-negligible bit error rate, that will be
denoted as QBER, while comparatively the bit error rate on the public classical channel
is typically very low, so that information reconciliation needs to be performed, typically
using as media the more reliable (but not secure) public channel. After both Alice and
Bob have knowledge of the secret key, Alice will encrypt the plaintext using the secret
key according to the encryption rule of the system, and send the encrypted message to
Bob, while Eve will not be able to recover the transmitted message, condition that Eve
does not have the knowledge of the secret key.
As mentioned earlier, the problem of information reconciliation will be considered as if
it were the source coding problem with side information. It is focused on effective FEC
which exploits the “soft-metric” available at the exit of both the quantum and the public
channel.
In Figure 4.3 the model for an equivalent systematic block-code in QKD system is pre-
sented. A composite channel is shown, which is formed by the parallel of the public
and the quantum channels. The information and redundancy bits transmitted by these two
communication channels constitute the codewords of an equivalent systematic block code.
Alice divides the original information bit stream into blocks of finite length nq which will
be encoded in a redundant way into codewords of length n. The information bits (nq bits
per codeword) are transmitted over the quantum private channel, while the redundancy
bits (r = (n − nq) bits per codeword) are transmitted over the classical public channel.
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The code rate (or information rate) is equal to Rc = nq/n which is the proportion of the
data-stream(nbits) that is useful (non-redundant)1.
Figure 4.3: Equivalent systematic block-code in QKD system.
The redundancy allows the receiver to detect and correct errors without re-transmission,
using Forward Error Correction techniques. In this context, iterative belief propagation
algorithms can be used to decode the codewords sent by Alice at the receiving stage, with
a maximum likelihood decoding rule.
As previously mentioned, powerful capacity achieving or capacity approaching LDPC or
polar codes with possibly long information blocks have been selected to make the quan-
tum channel more reliable. This choice is motivated by the characteristics of LDPC and
polar codes of being decodable in a time linearly proportional to their block length (when
iterative belief propagation techniques are used), so that acceptable decoding complexities
can be achieved also for large block lengths.
To minimize the quantity of information derived by Eve from the public channel the
code rate must be maximized. In Figure 4.4 the rate code along with the number of
available information and redundancy bits are highlighted, for a code with a rate equal to
nq/(nq+ r) = nq/n. It is important to notice that at the input of the LDPC decoder, there
will be n total available bits, i.e. n corresponding log-likelihood values.
The transmission rate on the QKD secret channel is generally very low since the technol-
ogy is very complex, while the actual data rate on the public channel can be very high. It
is therefore important to analyze the achievable overall QKD system rate. Furthermore,
in practical cases, the quantum bit error rate on the secret channel is typically high when
compared to the bit error rate of the public channel.
1That is, if for every nq bits of useful information, the coder generates totally n bits of data, of which r
are redundant
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Figure 4.4: Composite Channel model, systematic FEC code with code rate Rc =
nq/(nq + r).
4.3.1 Code Rate and security
The public channel is authentic, Eve can listen to the public channel but can’t do mea-
surements on it. The information transmitted on the classic public channel is completely
visible to the him. While on the other hand Eve can do measurements on the private quan-
tum channel, but by doing so he will perturb the state of the quantum system, and that can
lead to the detection of presence of Eve. In the security analysis it must be assumed that
Eve has perfect knowledge of the code, and therefore of the r parity check equations used
to generate the r parity bits ((n − nq) redundancy bits), that are assume to be received
(eavesdropped) perfectly and without errors. The question then is how much information
can Eve obtain about the nq information bits from the knowledge of the r parity bits.
The r parity check equations represent a system of r linear equations in nq variables over
GF(2). This system in the case of LDPC codes is indeed quite sparse (i.e., few variables
appear in each check equation). The space of solutions of such a system of equations rep-
resents the set of possible data sequences that Eve has access to. One of these solutions is
in fact, the true data transmitted through the private quantum channel. The larger the size
of the space of possible sequences, the more secure is the FEC code used against Eve.
This assumes that Eve does not possess any additional information that may reduce the
space of possible sequences. For instance, if the data transmitted by Alice is not indepen-
dent identically distributed (i.i.d.) (i.e. binary with equal probabilities), Eve can easily
focus on the most probable set of possible solutions of the linear equations. Note that the
structural properties of the particular LDPC code used, ultimately determines the extent
of the security of the system.
Let the data sequence transmitted over the private quantum channel be denoted by the
nq-component vector ~X, and the parity checks transmitted over the classic public channel
by the r-component vector ~P . The amount of information provided about ~X by ~P is the
mutual information I
(
~X,~P
)
= H
(
~P
)
H
(
~P | ~X
)
= H (P ) ≤ r, since H
(
~P | ~X
)
= 0
(i.e., given ~X , the amount of uncertainty remaining about ~P is zero). Remembering that
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the quantum channel operates in conjunction with a classic public channel, together with
the information bits the redundancy (parity check) bits generate an equivalent block code
with rate:
Rc =
nq
nq + r
(4.1)
So long as nq > 0, a secret key can be distilled for a fixed code rate by increasing the
block length. This puts a lower limit on the coding rate 1
1 + r/nq
of 0.5, which nonetheless
is loose since the security of the scheme even at coding rate 0.5 or below ultimately
depends on the particular FEC code being used.
4.4 System Characterization and Channel Models
In this section we present the system level models of the public and private channels in
Figure 4.1.
4.4.1 Classical Communication System
A far as the public channel is concerned, it uses classical communication system with
possibly strong coding so that the BER of the classic channel is very low. Typical Ad-
ditive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channel model may be used, as shown in Figure
4.5, where nk is a Gaussian random variable with variance σ
2 where for simplicity, a
binary transmission scheme has been considered with the following association between
the information bits bk and the transmitted levels
Figure 4.5: Classic AWGN model for the public channel.
The equivalent channel model shown in Figure 4.6 can be considered to represent a
classic “public” channel in the QKD protocol being proposed.
In this model, when a bipolar transmission scheme is used such as PAM, BPSK or
Gray coded QPSK, the kth transmitted redundant bit is bk ∈ (0,1), the associated kth
transmitted symbol is Xrk ∈ (
√
Eb, +
√
Eb), i.e. Xrk =
√
Eb(2bk − 1), while Nk ∈
N (0,σ2) is a Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance equals to σ2 =
N0/2 = Eb/2ηs, where ηs = Eb/N0 is the wireless link signal-to-noise ratio, and Yrk is
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Figure 4.6: Classical Communication Channel.
the received sample obtained at the output of the public channel detector.
If soft decoding techniques are used in decoding the capacity achieving block codes, the
channel output must be characterized with a likelihood ratio, i.e., the ratio between the
likelihood (probability) of obtaining a given channel output conditioned on the possible
transmitted bit. Often, the logarithm of this quantity defined as the Log Likelihood Ratio
(LLR) is used. The LLR value for the public channel in Figure 4.5 is [58]:
LLR (Yrk) = log
[
P
(
Xrk = +
√
Eb|Yrk
)
P
(
Xrk = −
√
Eb|Yrk
)
]
= log
[
P
(
Yrk |Xrk = +
√
Eb
)
P
(
Yrk|Xrk = −
√
Eb
)
]
= log
[
P (Yrk |bk = 1)
P (Yrk |bk = 0)
]
(4.2)
Equation 4.2 uses Bayes’ Theorem2. Given the previous hypotheses, the expressions for
the kth trasmitted and received symbols respectively, can be written as:
Xrk =
√
Eb(2bk − 1) (4.3)
Yrk = Xrk +Nk =
√
Eb(2bk − 1) +Nk (4.4)
Yrk are the real signal samples being received, whose conditional probability density
function is given by the Equation 4.5
fy(Yrk|bk) =
1
σ
√
2π
e−
−(Yrk
−
√
Eb(2bk−1))
2
2σ2 (4.5)
2Bayes’ Theorem: P (A|B) = P (B|A)P (A)
P (B)
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Finally, replacing the expressions presented in Equations 4.5 into Equation 4.2 the
value of the LLR’s metrics for the symbols received from the public channel can be ex-
pressed as:
This is the soft metric associated to the kth redundant bit, associated to the sample Yrk at
the output of the classic channel.
LLR (Yrk) =
2Yrk
√
Eb
σ2
(4.6)
4.4.2 Quantum Communication System
Many practical scenarios can be consider when modeling a quantum channel: the trans-
mitted qubit can be associated to a single photon or a multi-photon, and different specific
quantum states can be transmitted over the quantum channel (coherent state, entangled
state, squeezed state, etc).
In this thesis, both single photon and multi-photon transmission will be considered when
characterizing the quantum communication system in the context of the proposed QKD
protocol. When referring to multi-photon transmission, coherent states will be consid-
ered, generated using weak laser pulses (WLP) sources.
4.4.2.1 Single-Photon Quantum Channel
When a single-photon is transmitted, the quantum channel can be modeled as a simple
binary channel with error probability equal to the quantum bit error rate (QBER) Q, as
shown in Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7: Equavelent QKD channel composed of clasical AWGN and Quantum BSC
channel.
The expression for the Log-Likelihood metrics at the output of the quantum channel
represented by the model of Figure4.7 used as input for the soft-metric decoder, is given
by:
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LLR(Yqk) = log
[
P (Xqk = 1|Yqk)
P (Xqk = 0|Yqk)
]
= log
[
P (Yqk|Xqk = 1)
P (Yqk|Xqk = 0)
]
(4.7)
Denoting the k-th transmitted information bit as Xqk ∈ GF (2) = {0,1}, and the
received information bit as Yqk ∈ GF (2) = {0,1} Equation 4.7 can be rewritten as
follows:
LLR(Yqk) = log
[
P (Yqk = 1|Xqk)
P (Yqk = 0|Xqk)
]
=
{
log(1−Q
Q
, if Xqk = 1
log( Q
1−Q , if Xqk = 0
(4.8)
It is also important to notice that the log-likelihoods (metrics) LLR(Yqk) can only
assume two values, and will therefore be referred to as hard metrics or q-metrics,while
the metrics from the public channel LLR(Yrk) can assume any real value, and are called
soft metrics.
Since these metrics must be jointly used and compared in the LDPC decoder they need
to be compatible and comparable. The equivalent QKD channel composed of classical
AWGN and Quantum BSC channel that will provide us the available bits and metric for
soft decoding can be shown in Figure 4.8.
Figure 4.8: Equavelent QKD channel composed of clasical AWGN and Quantum BSC
channel.
44
4 – Soft-Metric based decision in QKD and Poisson photons channels
4.4.2.2 Binary Input Multiple Output (BIMO) Quantum Channel
This section will describe the use of photon counting detectors which generate soft in-
formation at the output of a quantum channel as opposed to quantum binary symmetric
channel which leads to hard decision decoding.
Figure 4.9 represents a sketch of the binary communication scheme based on polarization
degree of freedom of a coherent state |α〉. The information bit k = {0,1} is encoded
by applying the unitary transformation U(φk) to the polarization degree of freedom of a
coherent state |α〉, which is assumed to be initially in the polarization state |+〉 = |H〉+|V 〉√
2
.
This technique is based on the use of a Phase Beam Splitter (PBS) and two photon coun-
ters. The scheme allows one to map the discrete bit value “k” to an optical polarization
quantum bit (or qubit), but at the detection stage can produce a discrete set of real num-
bers, which can also be expressed in the form of Log-Likelihood Ratios (LLR) which can
be used for soft information processing. A possible experimental setup is shown in Figure
4.9, where the polarization degree of freedom φk of a coherent state is associated to the
information bit “k” according to the following encoding rule:
Table 4.1: Encoding rule
k −→ φk
0 −→ π/4
1 −→ 3π/4
So that there is a phase shift of π/2 of the qubit associated with k = 0 relative to
the qubit associated with k = 1. The transformation U(φk) = exp(
−φk
2
σ3) is then ap-
plied, where σ3 is the Pauli rotation matrix. This kind of transformation can be realized
by means of a potassium dihydrogen phosphate (KDP) crystal driven by a high voltage
generator and corresponds to change of the polarization from linear to elliptical.
At the detection stage a measurement of the phase shift of the qubit should be per-
formed. This can be implemented as depicted in Figure 4.9 by using a Half-Wave Plate
(HWP) placed in front of a Polarizing Beam Splitter (PBS) with two photon-counters pro-
viding the number of photons in the reflected and transmitted beams, denoted as n0 and
n1 respectively. Let n = n0+n1 denote the total number of detected photons. We assume
this is also the total number of transmitted photons (in the hypothesis that no photon is
lost), which is a Poisson distributed random variable with mean valueE [N ] = Nc = |α|2.
Notice that, due to the weak energy of the transmitted optical signal, the value of Nc is
typically small.
From the knowledge of the photon counts n0 and n1, the actual value of the phase shift
can be obtained by using the Bayesian estimator [34]
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Figure 4.9: The considered low-complexity photon-counting scheme.
φest =
∫ π
0
φpB(φ|n0,n)dφ = E {φ|n0,n} ,
where,
pB(φ|n0,n) = p(k=0|φ)
n0p(k=1|φ)n1
N
= p(0|φ)
n0p(1|φ)n−n0
N
(4.9)
is the probability density function of the received phase shift given the fact that n =
n0 + n1 photons have been received and n0 photons have been counted at the “k = 0”
output of the PBS. N is a normalization factor such that
∫ π
0
pB(φ|n0,n)dφ = 1,
This scenario generates the equivalent channel model with binary input (the random
variable k), and multilevel output (the couple of random variables n0,n1) shown in Figure
4.10, which will be discussed in what follows.
Evaluation of the Log-Likelihood Ratios
In soft-decoding algorithms, Log-Likelihood-Ratios are typically required, which, for the
channel model shown in Figure 4.10 can be defined as:
LLR(n0,n1) = log
[
p (k = 1|{n0,n1})
p (k = 0|{n0,n1})
]
(4.10)
46
4 – Soft-Metric based decision in QKD and Poisson photons channels
where,
p (k|{n0,n1}) = p (φk|{n0,n1}) k = 0,1 (4.11)
is the probability that the transmitted bit was ”k” given the measurement pair(n0,n1).
Using Baye’s theorem, Equation 4.10 can be rewritten as:
LLR(n0,n1) = log
[
p ({n0,n1} |k = 1)
p ({n0,n1}|k = 0)
]
(4.12)
Since coherent states are being used, the number of photons n0 and n1 measured at the
two detectors are uncorrelated and, in particular, are distributed according to a Poisson
statistic. Given φk, the average number N
(h)
k of photons of type k detected at the detector
“h” is given by the expression [33]:
N
(h)
k = Ncp(h|φk) h,k = 0,1 (4.13)
where Nc = |α|2 is the average number of photons of the input coherent state, and
p(0|φk) = 1
2
(
1 + e−∆
2
cos (φk)
)
p(1|φk) = 1
2
(
1− e−∆2cos (φk)
) (4.14)
Figure 4.10: BIMO channel model of the considered system.
where, to make the analysis more general, it is assumed that during propagation, the
qubit undergoes a phase diffusion process whose amplitude is characterized by the pa-
rameter ∆ (the feasibility of this scheme and its experimental demonstration have been
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thoroughly investigated in [44]).
We have therefore:
p(n0,n1|k) = P (n0,N (0)k )P (n1,N (1)k ) (4.15)
P (l,N) =
e−NN l
l!
(4.16)
where, P (l,N) = e
−NN l
l!
is the Poisson probability distribution. Then, substituting Equa-
Figure 4.11: Equavelent QKD channel composed of classical AWGN and Quantum
BIMO channel.
tion 4.16 into Equation 4.12 the following expression for the LLR can be easily obtained:
LLR(n0,n1) = (n0 − n1)log
(
pii
pij
)
(4.17)
where,
pii = P (0|φ0) = P (1|φ1) = 1
2
(
1 + e−∆
2
cos(
π
4
)
)
pij = P (1|φ0) = P (0|φ1) = 1
2
(
1− e−∆2cos(π
4
)
)
= 1− pii
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The system described up to this point can be modeled as a Discrete Memoryless Chan-
nel (DMC), and more precisely a Binary Input-Multiple Output (BIMO) channel, with
binary input k and n+ 1 = n0 + n1 + 1 outputs (n0,n1) (where n is a Poisson distributed
random variable) as shown in Figure 4.10. The capacity of this channel is evaluated in the
next chapter.
Finally, the equavelent QKD channel composed of classical AWGN and Quantum BIMO
channel, which will give us the available bits and metric for soft decoding is shown in
Figure 4.11.
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Chapter 5
Capacity of Bayesian Inference
Quantum Channel employing Photon
counting detectors
In Chapter 4.4.2.2 the potential improvements in key transmission rate in a Quantum Key
Distribution (QKD) scheme whereby photon-counting detectors (PCD) are used at the
receiver were discussed. To take full advantage of such detectors, soft information is gen-
erated in the form of Log-Likelihood Ratios (LLRs).
In order to quantify the performance improvement may be achieved by such a detector,
we will determine the capacity of the corresponding optical channel, and the achievable
residual Bit Error Rate (BER) of practical communication schemes on such a channel.
From a telecommunication point of view, the presence of a photon counting detector pro-
vides the possibility of generating at the receiver a soft-metric (as opposed to a hard metric
which essentially indicates the presence or absence of a signal from an on/off detector)
that may be used in iteratively decoded forward error correcting codes.
The receiver introduced in [33] is based on an optical setup for one-parameter qubit gate
optimal estimation [34, 44], where the qubit is a polarization state of coherent states and
the one-parameter gate corresponds to a polarization transformation. In the ideal case,
orthogonal polarization states can be perfectly discriminated. However, in a realistic sce-
nario and especially in free-space communication, non-dissipative noises affecting light
polarization disturbs the orthogonality of the states at the receiver, thus requiring a suitable
detection and strategy for discrimination. It is worth noting that coherent states preserve
their fundamental properties when propagating in purely lossy channels, suffering only
attenuation, thus only the noise affecting the polarization is the most detrimental.
In this chapter the limits of the achievable performance gains when using photon counting
detectors are explored and compared to the case when such detectors are not available.
To this end, the classical capacity of the Bayesian inference channel is found, clearly
showing the potential gains that photon counting detectors can provide in the context of a
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realistic cost-effective scheme from an implementation point of view. While there are bi-
nary communication schemes that can achieve a higher capacity for a given mean photon
count at the receiver compared to the scheme presented here (e.g., the Dolinar receiver
[36]), most such schemes are complex and at times unrealistic from an implementation
point of view.
5.1 Capacity Evaluation
The quantum channel in d-dimensions is often modeled as a completely positive trace
preserving map Ψ . The most common channel model is the depolarizing channel which
depends on one parameter λ mapping a mixed state in Cd into:
ρ −→ λρ + 1− λ
d
I
where I is the d × d identity matrix. For a general quantum channel, let ε denote the
ensemble of input states, andM the measurement or a Positive Operator Valued Measure
(POVM){Ej} at the channel output. The input state ensemble, channel and measurement
together define a classical noisy channel with transition probabilities:
pnm = Tr [Ψ (ρn)Em]
Defining the probabilities over the input state, which we will denote as X , a natural defi-
nition of classical capacity of the quantum channel would be:
Cshan(Ψ ) = sup
ε,M
I(X ; Y )
where Y is the output state and I(X ; Y ) is the Shannon mutual information. The com-
plication in defining the capacity of the quantum channel in contrast with the classical
channel arises in connection with the purely quantum-mechanical effects, which have no
analogue in the classical domain, like for instance the entanglement. In particular, it is
reasonable to assume (which is in fact shown to be true) that the capacity of parallel copies
of a quantum channel with entangled inputs may be larger than the sum capacity of each
channel treated separately. It turns out that for the most common channel model, namely
the depolarizing channel, entanglement buys nothing.
The closest analogue of the binary communication scheme proposed here is the Binary
Phase Shift Keying (BPSK) using coherent states. It is well known that for such a scheme
the Dolinar receiver achieves nearly optimal results with capacity [41],citechap5d:
CBPSK−Dolinar = 1−H2
(
0.5
(
1−
√
1− e−4NC
))
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where, H2(.) is the binary Entropy function. This capacity is close to the ultimate
capacity obtained using an as yet unknown optimal receiver:
CBPSK−Ultimate = 1−H2
(
0.5
(
1 + e−2NC
))
The Dolinar receiver requires a complicated feedback system for its implementation,
hence there is significant difference in the level of the complexity with respect to a photon
counting receiver.
The discussion thus far has been general and focused on quantum channels as trace-
preserving maps. However a much more humble pursuit in can be adopted and that is
modeling an experimental setup using realistic off-the-shelf components, and specifically
calculating the traditional Shannon capacity of the link viewed as a probabilistic transi-
tion mechanism that maps input bits into possibly multi-level outputs used for detection.
In this sense, the channel is modeled as a Binary Input-Multilevel Output (BIMO) Dis-
crete Memoryless Channel (DMC) as previously shown in Figure 4.10, and our goal is
to contrast the capacity of a system employing photon counting detectors to that of the
equivalent Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC) resulting from reducing the photon counts
to presence or absence of signals (i.e., hard decoding).
As noted earlier, the sufficient statistic for detection with photon counting detectors is the
count difference of detector 1 and 0 in Figure 4.9, i.e., (n1 − n0) . The outputs of the two
counters are independently distributed Poisson random variables, i.e.
n1 ∼ Poisson, µ1 = N (1)k
n0 ∼ Poisson, µ0 = N (0)k
where,
N
(1)
k = Ncp(1|φk)
N
(0)
k = Ncp(0|φk)
N
(0)
k +N
(1)
k = Nc
As a consequence, the difference (n1 − n0) is Skellam distributed, and we have
P (n1 − n0 = m|φk) =
e
−
(
N
(1)
k +N
(0)
k
)(
N
(1)
k
N
(0)
k
)m/2
I|m|
(
2
√
N
(1)
k N
(0)
k
)
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where, k = 0 or 1, and I|m|(.) is the modified Bessel function of the first kind and or-
der |m|. Note thatm itself is an integer that can be positive or negative. Plugging known
values of the parameters, we get:
N
(1)
k
N
(0)
k
=
p(1|φk)
p(0|φk)
N
(1)
k N
(0)
k = N
2
c p(1|φk)p(0|φk)
Specializing to the case ”0 is transmitted and is mapped to φ0” we get:
P (n1 − n0 = m|φ0) =
e−Nc
(√
2− e−∆2√
2 + e−∆2
)m/2
I|m|
(
Nc
√
1− e
−2∆2
2
)
similarly for the case “1 is transmitted and is mapped to φ1” :
P (n1 − n0 = m|φ1) =
e−Nc
(√
2 + e−∆
2
√
2− e−∆2
)m/2
I|m|
(
Nc
√
1− e
−2∆2
2
)
LetX be the random variable associated with the transmitted phase φk (or the transmitted
bit “k”) and Y be the channel output (i.e. our sufficient statistic (n1 − n0). Then, the
formulas above give us the channel transition probabilities for the considered DMC. Using
the classic definition of mutual information:
I(X ; Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y )
and noting that the input is binary with p(X = 0) = p(φ0) = p, and p(X = 1) =
p(φ1) = 1− p, after some manipulation we have:
p(X = 0|Y = m) = p
p(1− αm∆) + αm∆
p(X = 1|Y = m) = 1− p
p(1− αm∆) + αm∆
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where,
α∆ =
(
√
2 + e−∆
2
)
(
√
2− e−∆2)
Finally, the conditional entropy based on two parameters, p and ∆ can be written as:
H(X|Y ) =
− e−Nc
∑
m
p.(α∆)
−(m/2)(Bm)log (p(X = 0|Y = m))+
− e−Nc
∑
m
(1− p).(α∆)(m/2)(Bm)log (p(X = 1|Y = m))
where,
Bm = I|m|
(
Nc
√
1− e
−2∆2
2
)
While the BIMO DMC is neither symmetric nor weakly symmetric, it is not difficult
to show that the maximizing input probability distribution is uniform. Hence, p = 0.5
maximizes the mutual information leading to channel capacity. To compare the capacity
of the link employing photon counting detector to that of a simple detector signaling the
presence or absence of signal, it needs to be specified that how such a detector behaves.
It is logical to assume that cross-over probability of the equivalent BSC (i.e. the raw Bit
Error Rate, denoted in the following as QBER) associated with such a receiver can be
obtained as:
QBER =
inf∑
m=1
P (n1 − n0 = m|φ0) + 1
2
P (n1 − n0 = 0|φ0)
=
inf∑
m=1
P (n1 − n0 = −m|φ1) + 1
2
P (n1 − n0 = 0|φ1)
(5.1)
Notice that when (n1− n0) = 0 (which for low values of Nc happens often), the detector
chooses at random between k = 0 and k = 1.
Figure 5.1 depicts the capacity of our BIMO DMC and its comparison to the equivalent
Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC) in case of hard decision decoding as a function of the
mean photon count Nc in the case the phase diffusion parameter ∆ is zero.
Figure 5.2 depicts the capacity of our BIMO DMC and its comparison to the equivalent
BSC in case of hard decision decoding as a function of the phase diffusion parameter ∆
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Figure 5.1: Classical capacity of BIMO DMC(solid curve) compared to the equivalent
BSC with transition probability QBER, as a function of mean photon count Nc.
for three different values of the mean photon count Nc.
It can be observed that the BIMO DMC channel offers a capacity improvement over the
equivalent BSC. This improvement could lead to a BER improvement when comparing
the two channels in presence of an error correction code, as it will be shown in chapter 7.
Figure 5.2: Classical capacity of BIMO DMC and equivalent BSC with transition proba-
bility QBER as a function of phase diffusion parameter∆ for three different values of Nc
(solid line: Nc = 9, dash-dot line: Nc = 6, dash line: Nc = 3).
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Chapter 6
LDPC Coding for QKD at Higher
Photon Flux Levels Based on Spatial
Entanglement of Twin beams in PDC
Twin beams generated by Parametric Down Conversion (PDC) exhibit quantum correla-
tions that has been effectively used as a tool for many applications including calibration
of single photon detectors. By now, detection of multi-mode spatial correlations is a ma-
ture field and in principle, only depends on the transmission and detection efficiency of
the devices and the channel. In [60], [62], [63], the authors utilized their know-how on
almost perfect selection of modes of pairwise correlated entangled beams and the opti-
mization of the noise reduction to below the shot-noise level, for absolute calibration of
Charge Coupled Device (CCD) cameras. The same basic principle is currently being con-
sidered by the same authors for possible use in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [[61],
[59]]. The main advantage in such an approach would be the ability to work with much
higher photon fluxes than that of a single photon regime that is theoretically required for
discrete variable QKD applications (in practice, very weak laser pulses with mean photon
count below one are used). The natural setup of quantization of CCD detection area and
subsequent measurement of the correlation statistic needed to detect the presence of the
eavesdropper Eve, leads to a QKD channel model that is a Discrete Memoryless Channel
(DMC) with a number of inputs and outputs that can be more than two (i.e., the channel
is a Multilevel DMC).
This chapter investigates the use of Low Density Parity Check (LDPC) codes for infor-
mation reconciliation on the effective parallel channels associated with the multi-level
DMC.
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6.1 Introduction
Parametric Down Conversion (PDC) is an effective means of producing entangled pho-
tons. The state produced by spontaneous PDC exhibits perfect momentum phase match-
ing for a plane wave pump field.
The state of a single bipartite transverse mode near degeneracy can be written as:
|ψ (~q)〉 =
∑
n
C~q (n) |n〉i,~q |n〉s, ~−q (6.1)
where, i stands for the idler and s stands for the signal beam. The two modes in Equation
6.1 are entangled in the number of photons in each pair of modes ±~q. Imaging the beams
in the far field of a thin lens of focal length f in a f −f arrangement as depicted in Figure
6.1, leads to an association of each mode to a unique position in the focal plane via the
mapping:
2cf
ωp
~q → ~x
Hence, a perfect correlation should be detected in the photon numbers ni,~x and ns,−~x
Figure 6.1: General block diagram of the experimental setup from [62].
where the center of symmetry relative to which the symmetric positions are identified is
the pump detection plane interception point. In reality, the pump field is not a perfect
plane wave, rather a Gaussian beam with spatial waist wp inducing an uncertainty in the
relative propagation direction of the twin photons on the order of the angular beam-width
of the pump. This uncertainty is the coherence area of the process roughly corresponding
to the transverse size of the mode in the far field and is given by:
Aωh ∼
[
2πcf
ωpwp
]2
The number of spatial modes observed over a detection area that is usually taken to be
much larger than the coherence area is given by Mspatial = Adet,j/Acoh, where j = i or
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s. Similarly, it is assumed that the detection time is much larger than the coherence time
hence the number of temporal modesMt = Tdet/Tcoh is much larger than one. The total
number of modes in the detection region is Mtot = MspatialMt. The different modes in
a single region are independent and thus the statistics of the detected photons is multi-
thermal with mean value 〈Nj〉 = Mtotηjµ, where, j = i or s, µ is the number of photons
per mode, and ηj is the overall efficiency. The variance of the number of detected photons
is given by:
〈δ2Nj〉 = 〈Nj〉
(
1 +
〈Nj〉
Mtot
)
= 〈Nj〉 (1 + ε) = Mtotηjµ (1 + ηjµ) (6.2)
where ε is the excess noise defined as fluctuations that exceed the Shot Noise Limit (SNL).
The co-variance between the signal and idler photon numbers is given by:
〈δNiδNs〉 = Mtotηjηsµ (1 + µ) (6.3)
The correlation statistic between signal and idler is measured in terms of the fluctuations
of the difference N− = Ns −Ni normalized to the corresponding level of shot noise:
σ =
〈δ2N−〉
〈Ni +Ns〉 = 1− η+ +
η2−
4η2+
(
η+ +
〈Ns +Ni〉
Mtot
)
(6.4)
where, η+ = (ηs + ηi) /2 and η− = ηs − ηi. If the losses are perfectly balanced,
ηs = ηi = η and we get σ = 1 − η depending only on the quantum efficiency. In
the ideal case of perfect efficiency, indeed, σ → 0 while for classical states of light the
degree of correlation is bounded by σ ≥ 1 with the lower limit achieved by coherent
beams leading to σ = 1. The basic requirement on the size of the detection area is that
the number of speckles in the region far exceed the number on the perimeter. A pictorial
representation of this is depicted in Figure 6.2. The core idea of using the spatial en-
tanglement of twin beams for Quantum key Distribution (QKD) stems from the fact that
the correlation statistic generated on two symmetric regions in the CCD focal plane must
exhibit σ < 1. Eavesdropping by Eve will lead to increase in σ above one and is therefore
detectable. Indeed, the extent of interference by Eve may be measured by how much σ
has increased beyond its expected value. Depending on the extent of this interference,
the parties can decide to either continue generating a random key or halt the process all
together. Note that under ideal circumstances σ → 0, while practically, it is always above
zero but hopefully sufficiently below one to allow for secure communication to take place.
This is pictorially depicted in Figure 6.3. In reality, one cannot assert that eavesdropping
Eve will always lead to σ > 1. Even in the simplest situation, Eve can always reduce the
level of eavesdropping for having σ < 1, but then again the information she acquires will
be very small as well.
Eventually, disposing of ideal technologies, Eve can measure a certain numberN of pho-
tons and reproduce it by a squeezed source in the photon number even post selected (e.g.,
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Speckle patterns. No. 
of speckles in 
detection area >> No. 
on perimeter. 
Figure 6.2: A detection region identified as a square on the upper right corner whereby
the condition that the number of speckles in the region is much larger than that on the
perimeter is satisfied.
a PDC sources), sending to Bob the signal only when she observes N Photons in the
heralding channel. However, if one could detect quantum correlations in the near field
and in the far field, this would correspond to having two conjugated bases. In this case,
only entanglement should provide strict correlation at the same time in the two measure-
ments, a situation that cannot be reproduced by Eve.
The process of generating a random key based on this core concept is as follows:
• Alice generates the twin beams via PDC and images one of the two beams on its
CCD array and launches the second beam towards Bob;
• both Alice and Bob are assumed to have achieved timing synchronization so they
know the start and end time of each firing of the laser pulses;
• the CCD detection area is partitioned into a number of smaller detection areas we
call super-pixels, say four equal sized regions, satisfying our basic requirement that
the detection area be much larger than the coherence area of the spatial modes;
• Alice and Bob make measurements on one reference quadrant (Alice and Bob’s
reference quadrants are at symmetric positions). Alice sends Bob her measurement
results that Bob uses to estimate σ based on his a-priori knowledge of system level
parameters and experimental setup uncertainties. Bob repeats the same process on
a different set of measurement so that Alice can obtain a similar statistic. If the
measured σ is acceptable by both parties, they continue with the protocol;
59
6 – LDPC Coding for QKD at Higher Photon Flux Levels Based on Spatial Entanglement of Twin beams in PDC
• assuming the measurements made on the reference quadrant in the previous step
indicated that impact of eavesdropping by Eve is tolerable, Alice and Bob make
measurements of the number of the detected photons in the other quadrants. A pair
of quadrants, one at Alice and one at Bob, that are in symmetric regions of their
CCDs focal plane represent a quantum channel between the two parties. In our
example, three of the four quadrants would be used and constitute three parallel
quantum channels that can be used to generate random keys;
• for each of the quantum channels described in the previous step, Alice and Bob
make a measurement of the number of their detected photons and use binning and
associate a unique label to their measurement. Ideally, for each quantum channel,
Alice and Bob obtain an identical sequence of labels in their measurement that
constitute a secret key. In practice, fluctuations in the number of measured photons
lead to discrepancies and the label sequence at Alice and Bob don’t match perfectly,
hence requiring Information Reconciliation (IR) and privacy amplification to lead
to distilled keys that can be used for cryptography.
Figure 6.3: Pictorial representation of the impact of eavesdropping by Eve on the mea-
sured correlation statistic.
6.2 Development of the Channel Model
The aim of this section is to outline in detail the process for generating the binary or
multilevel DMC channel model for each of the parallel quantum channels described in
the previous section. To this end, we need a detailed knowledge of the photon statistics
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in each detection area. As stated previously, the number of modes in a given detection
area is very large. The number of temporal modes is dependent on the duration of the
laser pulse width and the coherence time and is reported to be 5000 in [62]. The number
of spatial modes is dependent on the size of the detection area that carries a trade-off in
terms of the degree of the determination of the Center of Symmetry (CS), requiring a
small detection area, and visibility of the quantum correlation, requiring a large detection
area. The determination of the center of symmetry can be done with high resolution using
small pixels and then performing the experiment with larger pixels.
In the experimental setup presented in [62], the number of spatial modes is about 150.
Given the large number of detected modes, the statistic of the number of detected photons
in a given region is multi-thermal.For a single mode, the thermal distribution is geometric
with Probability Mass Function (PMF) P1 (n) = (1− ζ) ζn, where, the parameter ζ is
related to the mean of the geometric PMF λ via ζ = λ
1+λ
. The photons in different modes
are independent and therefore the PMF of the total number of detected photons in N
modes is the N-fold convolution of the geometric PMF and given by:
PN (k) =
(k +N − 1)!
k! (N − 1)! (1− ζ)
N ζk
The mean and variance of the photon number in this case is given by E [X ] = Nλ and
σ2X = Nλ (1 + λ).
In each detection region, at either Alice or Bob, the number of photons are counted and
using a binning approach (i.e., multi-level quantization), the bin to which the number of
detected photons belong is identified and the associated symbol is assigned as a com-
ponent of a potential secret key. The Alice and Bob’s measurements on the symmetric
detection regions illuminated by the entangled twin beams may either result in identi-
cal bins, leading to identical symbols, or different bins leading to two different symbols.
The derivation of the channel model requires computation of the probability that a certain
number of photons is detected at Alice, and another number is detected at Bob. Once
this joint probability is known, the computation of the transition probabilities associated
with the resulting DMC modeling the behavior of a fictitious channel we may imagine
exists between Alice and Bob and causes discrepancies between their detected symbols
becomes straightforward.
The problem of determination of the number of detected photons at Alice and Bob is es-
sentially a bipartite detection problem. Let P (n) denote the probability of generation of
n photon-pairs at the source and let Bin (k|n,ζ) denote the binomial PMF:
Bin (k|n,ζ) = n!
k!(n− k)!ζ
k(1− ζ)n−k
then the probability of detecting k photons at Alice andm photons at Bob is given by:
P (k,m) =
∞∑
n=max(k,m)
P (n)Bin (k|n,ζA)Bin (k|n,ζB) (6.5)
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where, ζA and ζB are related to the mean of the geometric PMF for a single mode. Substi-
tuting PN (n) for P () in above expression we get the desired PMF of detecting k photons
at Alice and simultaneouslym photons at Bob over our detection area.
6.3 Information Reconciliation
Alice and Bob need to be in possession of identical sequences of symbols before they can
proceed with privacy amplification and generate secure keys for encryption. Information
Reconciliation (IR) is the process of eliminating discrepancies that may exist in the se-
quences at Alice and Bob as much as possible. This is achieved, as seen in the previous
chapters, using error correction coding. The process is not perfect in that there is always
some residual symbol errors left leading to very low symbol and frame error rates. By
selecting a very low frame error rate threshold, one can almost guarantee that the symbol
sequences at Alice and Bob are identical with very high probability. Multitude of error
correction techniques are available for information reconciliation. Broadly speaking, we
can classify the available techniques into
I Forward Error Correction (FEC) techniques, and;
II interactive two-way coding schemes with feedback such as the CASCADE algo-
rithm.
Fundamentally from an information theoretic point of view , there is no advantage to two-
way interactive techniques (this is reinforced in light of the given symmetry of the problem
formulation presented in the introduction section). Either Alice or Bob could initiate an
information reconciliation protocol since their roles are perfectly interchangeable.
There are however some simple criteria one could apply in making the selection of a
suitable technique:
• the code must be systematic since the data block is what Alice and Bob have di-
rect access to, albeit, with possible discrepancies. As previously noted, there is no
channel per-se between Alice and Bob. We may view the discrepancy between their
symbol sequences as having been caused by a fictitious Q-ary DMC;
• any systematic FEC generates coded symbols that need to be communicated across
a classic public channel. We assume the encoding operation is performed at Alice
while decoding is performed at Bob;
• most modern decoding techniques rely on the use of soft-information processing
and this is what we shall assume as well. We have however, two separate channels
that lead to two different soft metrics that would need to be combined in decoding.
The fictitious channel between Alice and Bob is modeled as aQ-ary DMC, the real
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channel over which the coded symbols propagate is a public channel we assume to
be Gaussian.
Given the previous considerations, an LDPC FEC code has been selected for this ap-
plications, given its attractive performances and the availability of low-complexity soft-
decoding algorithms, as discussed in the previous chapters. As an initial simplified
Figure 6.4: The considered Q-ary channel model (Q = 4).
model we will consider a Q-ary DMC channel model (initially with Q = 4) as shown
in Figure 6.4, with input alphabet X = {xk}Qk=1 = {00,01,10,11} and output alphabet
Y = {yk}Qk=1 = {00,01,10,11}. We associate a binary labeling to the Q transmitted
symbols, and denote as pi the probability of having i bit errors in one transmitted Q-
ary symbol (i = 1,2), with the added hypothesis (justified by preliminary tests) that the
probability of having one bit error per symbol is independent on the position of the error
within the symbol. With reference to Figure 6.4 notice that, in the hypothesis of indepen-
dent equally likely transmitted bits, the equivalent bit error probability (i.e. the equivalent
Quantum Bit Error Rate - QBER) is
QBER = P (biterror) = p1 + p2 (6.6)
The Q-ary channel model in Figure 6.4 is used to transmit the k bits that compose the
cryptographic key. After the transmission of the key, and once the presence of Eve has
been excluded as described in Section 6.1, additional m redundancy bits are transmitted
on a parallel ideal Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC), so that the k information bits to-
gether with them redundancy bits represent a n = k+m bits codeword of a rateRc = k/n
code. Note that the above channel model is obtained from proper binning of the photon
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numbers at the transmitter and receiver (i.e., the intervals used to define the channel sym-
bols at input and output can be adjusted to get the transition probabilities that adhere to
the model above). At the receiver a soft metric LDPC decoder is employed, operating
according to a belief propagation strategy, with input soft metrics from theQ-ary channel
evaluated as:
LLR
(
yik
)
= log
(∑
x∈x(0)i P (yk|x)∑
x∈x(1)i P (yk|x)
)
(6.7)
where LLR (yik) is the Log Likelihood Ratio (LLR) of the i
th bit of the received symbol
yk and x ()
i
are the symbols of X whose ith bit has weight w. Applying Equation 6.7 to
our channel model we obtain
LLR
(
yik
)
=


+log
(
1−p1−p2
p1+p2
)
, if yik = 0
−log
(
1−p1−p2
p1+p2
)
, if yik = 1
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Chapter 7
Performance results
In this thesis we have considered optical communication scenarios where low number
of photons are transmitted or detected. As described in the previous chapters these low
photon number communication can include both QKD and weak energy optical commu-
nication.
Therefore, in this chapter, the novel protocol for information reconciliation in QKD, and
error correction in the case of both QKD and weak energy optical communication are
validated by means of intensive software simulations under well defined scenarios.
7.1 Simulations Setup
In order to exemplify the performances of capacity achieving iteratively soft decoded
codes for the above mentioned applications, simulation results for the error rates achiev-
able with LDPC code of various rates as a function of various system parameters, such as
the quantum bit error rate QBER and mean photon count Nc will be presented.
QKD: For QKD application we have used the composite channel, which comprises of
a classical public channel and a private quantum channel as shown in Figure 7.1. The
public channel will be modeled as an AWGN channel with a high signal-to-noise ratio
(Eb/No)(since powerful coding is allowed on the public link and therefore possible errors
on this channel may be considered extremely rare). For private channel we considered
different secure quantum channels.
Furthermore, we assume that the information bits are transmitted on a private quantum
channel modeled as in Figure 4.7, Figure 4.10 or Figure 6.4, while the additional redun-
dancy bits are transmitted on a public channel, modelled as an Additive White Gaussian
Noise (AWGN) channel, as shown in Figure 7.1. A block of nq information bits plus the
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corresponding r redundancy bits generate one codeword of a block FEC code with rate:
Rc =
nq
nq + r
Weak Energy Optical Communication: For other low photon application we did the
simulation only on the quantum channel of Figure 4.7 or Figure 4.10 because it does not
need the parallel classical channel. In this case all the information and redundancy bits are
transmitted on a single channel. For these applications we have conducted the simulation
study using both LDPC and polar codes.
For the presentation of the simulation results, two figures will be used: the Bit Error
Rate(BER)and the Frame Error Rate(FER). A single frame is equivalent to a decoded
code block.
Figure 7.1: The composite channel (composed of the parallel secure and public channels)
linking transmitter and receiver in QKD applications.
7.2 Performance Results for Weak Energy Optical Com-
munication
In this section we will describe the performance results obtained through simulation of
different quantum channel models using capacity achieving iteratively decoded channel
codes, i.e., LDPC and polar codes. we used the channels as shown in Figure 4.7 and
Figure 4.10. The LLR’s which gives the soft information to the decoder for these channels
were computed in channel chapter 4. The description of the codes used was given in
chapter 3.
7.2.1 Performance with LDPC codes
First of all we would like to show the code gain that can be achieved by using error
correcting codes as compared to the case when there is no coding, and the performance
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gain is clearly visible in Figure 7.2. Figure 7.3 depicts two sets of simulation results.
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Figure 7.2: BER comparison for rate 0.61 LDPC(408,252) and rate 0.8 LDPC(1000,800)
versus uncoded Quantum BSC and BIMO channels as a function of QBER
Each pair of curves is associated with a residual Bit Error Rate (BER) and Frame Error
Rate (FER) curves. The LDPC code used for error correction is one with nq = 500,
r = 500 and code rate Rc = 0.5. The black pair (labeled “Q-BSC”) is for quantum
channel, modeled BSC with transition probability QBER. In this system, we assume the
receiver does not to use the additional information derived from the knowledge of n0
and n1 , and we use as equivalent channel model, a simple Binary Symmetric Channel
(BSC) with binary input X , binary output Y and cross-over probability QBER, (so that
P (Y = 0|X = 1) = P (Y = 1|X = 0) = QBER ), whose LLR values can be expressed
as Equation 4.7. The red pair (curves labeled “Q-BIMO”) is associated with the use of
a quantum channel modeled as a BIMO DMC as shown in Figure 4.10 with equivalent
un-coded bit error probability QBER and LLR metrics generated via photon counting
according to Equation 4.17. Notice that for the “Q-BIMO” curves the QBER parameter
is actually the cross-over probability of the equivalent BSC as defined in Equation 7.1 for
the BIMO channel.
QBER =
inf∑
m=1
P (n1 − n0 = m|φ0) + 1
2
P (n1 − n0 = 0|φ0)
=
inf∑
m=1
P (n1 − n0 = −m|φ1) + 1
2
P (n1 − n0 = 0|φ1)
(7.1)
As is evident from the results there is significant reduction in BER and FER. The Poisson
channel with soft metric performs much better than BSC channel with no soft informa-
tion. Figure 7.4 depicts three sets of simulation results. Each pair of curves is associated
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Figure 7.3: BER and FER performance of BSC and BIMO channels with LDPC code at
rate 0.5.
with residual Bit Error Rate (BER) and Frame Error Rate (FER) values after decoding.
LDPC codes with the following parameters have been considered:
(a) k = 500, r = 500 and code rate Rc = 0.5,
(b) k = 252, r = 156 and code rate Rc = 0.61,
(c) k = 750, r = 250 and code rate Rc = 0.75.
Again here the black pair (labeled “Q-BSC”) is for the the quantum BSC channel and red
pair (labeled “Q-BIMO”) is for BIMO DMC.
The blue curves represent the performance obtainable over a fictitious Additive White
Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channel model with a Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) that would
yield the considered raw bit error probability QBER if a binary antipodal scheme were
used for data transmission (curves labeled as “Q-AWGN”). As is evident from the results
for the photon counting receiver, there is significant reduction in BER and FER values
when using, the appropriate BIMO channel model and the associated LLR metrics de-
rived in Equation 4.17 instead of the simpler BSC model (notice that the “Q-AWGN”
curves have been only derived for reference, since with the small number of considered
photons the AWGN channel model would not be appropriate).
The FER-BER performance show the improvement that can be achieved with the use of
the BIMO channel model and the associated LLR metrics. For instance in Figure 7.4a at
QBER = 0.1, there is more than three orders of magnitude improvement in BER and
FER when comparing the proposed soft-metric processing versus the reference protocol
whereby the quantum channel is a BSC. This is improvement in performance is the result
of soft decoding instead of hard decoding, because the Q-BIMO channel model provide
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(a) k = 500, r = 500 and Rc = 0.5 (b) k = 252, r = 156 and Rc = 0.61
(c) k = 750, r = 250 and Rc = 0.75
Figure 7.4: BER and FER simulation results for a LDPC code with a) k = 500,r = 500
and code rate Rc = 0.5, b) k = 252, r = 156 and code rate Rc = 0.6 1and c) k = 750,
r = 250 and code rateRc = 0.75, obtained with different models of the quantum channel:
BSC (Q-BSC curves), AWGN (Q-AWGN curves) and BIMO DMC (Q-BIMO curves)
the decoder with soft information, which is not available in the case of Q-BSC channel.
Figure 7.4b and Figure 7.4c compare the FER-BER performance of the considered chan-
nel models and LLR values with LDPC codes with rates 0.61 and 0.75, respectively. It
can be observed that a FER-BER improvement of up to several orders of magnitude can
be obtained in these cases as well. It can also be observed that at higher code rate, the
performances obtainable with the BIMO LLR soft-metrics gets closer to the performance
of the classic AWGN channel metrics (although, as mentioned before, the AWGN model
would not be applicable in the current case).
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Figure 7.5: BER simulation results for a LDPC code with code rate Rc = 0.5,0.61 and
0.75 obtained with different models of the quantum channel: BSC (Q-BSC curves), and
BIMO DMC (Q-BIMO curves)
Figure 7.6: BER simulation results for a LDPC code with code rate Rc = 0.5,0.61 and
0.75 obtained with different models of the quantum channel:AWGN (Q-AWGN curves),
and BIMO DMC (Q-BIMO curves)
Figure 7.5 compares the BER values obtained with the BSC and the BIMO channel mod-
els for different code rates, showing that as expected, for higher rates, a lower QBER
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values is required before significant coding gains can be observed.
From Figure 7.6, we can observe that the BIMO channel can be approximated with an
AWGN channel for high values of Nc, i.e. low values of QBER, while the AWGN model
yields unreliable results with a low mean number of photons Nc, i.e. with high QBER.
This effect is more evident with lower coding rates (as shown below, where the coding
gain becomes apparent at low values of Nc).
7.2.2 Performance with Polar codes
We also did some performance analysis through the simulation of polar codes for various
rates with block length N = 1024 for both BIMO and BSC channels. But here we will
present the results obtained through simulating rate 0.7 polar code. And we will compare
it to LDPC code with rate 0.75 and code length N = 1000.
Figure 7.7 shows the comparison of polar codes and LDPC codes for rate 0.7 using Q-BSC
channel. We have plotted BER and block error rate (BLER) with respect to QBER. We
can see that polar codes performs much better than LDPC on Q-BSC channel. Figure 7.8
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Figure 7.7: Polar codes vs LDPC for BSC at rate 0.7
shows the comparison of polar codes and LDPC codes for rate 0.7 using Q-BIMO chan-
nel. We have plotted BER and FER with respect to QBER. Here we can observe that
LDPC codes performance is quite better than polar code. This may be because polar
codes are channel specific codes and in the code construction process, we have design our
polar codes for BSC channel and then we use Gausian Approximation (GA) technique for
the construction of polar codes for BIMO channel using the same capacity as of BSC.
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Figure 7.8: Polar codes vs LDPC for BIMO at rate 0.7
7.3 Performance Results for QKD
In this section we will describe the performance result obtained by using LDPC codes
for the QKD protocol described in Section 4.The LDPC decoder uses belief propagation
techniques, the values of the soft-metrics (LLRs) derived from the two sub-systems that
form the composite communication channel, are calculated according to the schemes se-
lected to model each one of them. The bit values and the LLRs values after the quantum
and the classical transmission should be passed as an input to the decoder. The number of
iterations for decoding can be selected as well as the minimum number of errors the user
intends to correct. The parity matrix of the LDPC code used in the simulations is chosen
from a set of suggested codes.
In Figure 7.9, the performance of two LDPC codes with rates 0.5 and 0.61 are shown
and compared. we can see that by increasing the code rate BER performances becomes
worst, that is because more information travels on the quantum channel which has high
bit error rate. On the others side the security of QKD increases, since a lower fraction of
bits are revealed on the classic public channel. This results leads us to the conclusion that
we need to use higher rate codes in order to make the QKD protocol more secure. For
this purpose we have done simulation with different high rate codes.
We did the performance analysis of soft metric based QKD protocol using higher rates
codes i.e., LDPC code with rate 0.61 and 0.75 for the composite QKD channel, where for
private channel we used three types of quantum channels: BSC,AWGN and BIMO, the
results are depicted in Figure 7.10 and Figure 7.11.
It is clear from both of these figures that even in the case of QKD, the soft decoding
because of the soft information that photon counting detectors provide, improves the per-
formance. We can see that the BER and FER is much better for Q-BIMO curves (red)
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Figure 7.9: BER and FER performance of two LDPC codes with block length n = 504
and Rc = 0.5 and n = 408 and Rc = 0.61, respectively, as a function of the private
channel QBER.
Figure 7.10: BER and FER performance of LDPC codes with block length n = 408 and
Rc = 0.61, respectively, as a function of the private channel QBER, obtained with dif-
ferent models of the quantum channel: BSC (Q-BSC curves), AWGN (Q-AWGN curves)
and BIMO DMC (Q-BIMO curves).
than Q-BSC curves (black).
Figure 7.12 shows the residual BER on the BIMO channel for different values of mean
photon count Nc. The fact is that as Nc increases QBER decreases and vice versa. so, as
the mean photon count increases the performance improves.
All of the above results were based on the use of 2 level quantum system (i.e., Qubits).
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Figure 7.11: BER and FER performance of LDPC codes with block length n =
1000,nq = 750and Rc = 0.75, respectively, as a function of the private channel QBER,
obtained with different models of the quantum channel: BSC (Q-BSC curves), AWGN
(Q-AWGN curves) and BIMO DMC (Q-BIMO curves
Figure 7.12: BER simulation results for a LDPC code with code rate Rc = 0.5,0.61 and
0.75 obtained with BIMO channel for different values of Nc
Multilevel quantum system (i.e., Qudits) were also considered and an example of 4 level
system as shown in Section 6.3 Figure 6.4 was simulated.
A rate 0.8 (1000,800) LDPC code has been applied to perform IR on the scheme
described in Section 6.3 selecting, for the same overall QBER, different values of p1
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Figure 7.13: BER performances of a (1000,800) binary LDPC over the Q-ary channel in
Figure 6.4 for (2) p1 = (QBER)
2 , (3) p1 = (QBER)
2/2 and (4) p1 = QBER/2 as
a function of QBER, compared with (1) a BSC with transition probability QBER. In (2),
(3) and (4) p2 = QBER − p1 .
Figure 7.14: Efficiency with LDPC codes for different coding rates. The red continuous
line is a graphical lower bound of the efficiency of the CASCADE IR algorithm.
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and p2 . The decoded Bit Error Rate (BER) performances shown in Figure 7.13 have
been obtained by Montecarlo simulation, showing that the decoded BER depends on the
overall QBER value and not on how the error probability is distributed on the first and
second bit of the Q-ary channel. This proves, in practice, that with the considered binary
FEC LDPC codes the use of a Q-ary channel is equivalent to log2(Q) successive uses of
a BSC with the same value of QBER.
LDPC codes with different rates have then been simulated, obtaining the efficiency of the
considered information reconciliation scheme. The efficiency, defined as [64]
ǫ =
1− Rc
H(X|Y ) =
1− Rc
RcH2(QBER)
(7.2)
is shown in Figure 7.14, where the considered codeword lengths n are always smaller or
equal to 1000. It can be noticed that the proposed scheme allows to achieve efficiency
values better than the CASCADE algorithm with reasonable complexities, proving the
effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
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Conclusion
In this thesis we have considered the applications of Optical/Quantum communication
where low number of photons are used. For these kind of applications the receiver sen-
sitivity is very important in order to decode the information bit. single photon detectors
technology is the underlying technology for these applications, which offers the required
sensitivity. These application may include Quantum key distribution (QKD), quantum
communication under extreme(stressed) environment and Low probability of intercept
optical communication. For all these applications the use of photons(light) have been
considered because of its underlying advantages.
In any Quantum Key Distribution system, Alice and Bob may use one of two types of rec-
onciliation, in order to preserve the integrity and security of their keys. The first type is
interactive reconciliation, which consists of two-way interaction between Alice and Bob
over a public classical channel for the detection and correction of errors. The second type
of interaction is one-way reconciliation in which a decision is made beforehand regarding
how errors are detected and corrected. Considering the fact that, one-way protocols, by
their nature, tend to reveal less information over the public channel than interactive pro-
tocols where possibly many messages are openly passed back and forth, in this work a
novel information reconciliation and data sifting protocol has been proposed, which uses
Forward Error Correction (FEC), minimizing the exchange of information related to the
secret key that needs to be sent back and forth using the public channel. This protocol, is
based on soft decoding of LDPC codes with mixed-metric inputs, where the information
derived from a private quantum channel and a classic public channel are jointly used for
decoding. The performance of the proposed methods has been studied by simulation, and
the effects of the various system parameters have been considered.
The suggested algorithms can be applied to QKD schemes based both on Single Photon or
WLP sources, with or without decoy states. The difference among the different schemes
is the use of different channel metrics. However, independently from the scheme used,
the protocol allows both parties involved in a quantum key distribution to identify a sifted
secret key with minimum information exchange and reduced computational costs.
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Specifically, in this thesis, the gains that can be achieved in the secret key rates of a QKD
protocol and the performance improvement in other low photon communication scenar-
ios, from the use of more advanced receivers employing photon counting detectors have
been explored, motivated by the fact that the the presence of such detectors allows for the
generation of soft-metrics at the receiver. Within the context of this system, a multi-level
quantum channel BIMO Quantum-DMC has been identified and the evaluation of its the-
oretical capacity bound has been calculated.
The BIMO Quantum-DMC offered a capacity improvement over the equivalent BSC
quantum channel (leading to a BER improvement when comparing the two channel in
presence of an error correction code), translating in a significant reduction of the values
of the BER and FER for several QBER values; meaning that a significant larger portion
of the data after the stages of sifting and reconciliation may be kept There has been much
interest in quantum key distribution.
Experimentally, quantum key distribution over 150 km of commercial Telecom fibers and
over 144 km in atmosphere has been successfully performed. The crucial issues in quan-
tum key distribution are the security and the key rate. All recent experiments are, in
principle, insecure due to real-life imperfections. However with the use of methods like
decoy states, it is possible to make most of those experiments by using essentially the
same set-up. Since the security aspect seems to be improved by the use of such methods,
it is becoming more and more important to obtain elevated key rates from QKD systems to
keep up with the high rates of practically any telecommunication system, this way secure
data transmission may be guarantee by using one time pad encryption algorithms.For this
reason we have use high rate code and obtained the performance in terms of such codes.
This thesis also offers a preliminary investigation on the use of FEC LDPC codes for
information reconciliation when the underlying channel is a Q-ary DMC, for QKD ap-
plications based on higher photon flux levels with spatial entanglement of twin beams in
PDC, and shows that acceptable error reconciliation efficiency values are obtained with
reasonable complexity.
Polar codes have been designed and used for error correction of both single photon
communication(Quantum-BSC) and WLP communication(BIMOQuantum-DMC) chan-
nels with the use of soft decoding. And its performance have been reported.
In general, the availability of the soft-metric allows for the use of advanced iterative soft-
decoding techniques during the information reconciliation phase, significantly reducing
the residual bit and frame error rates with subsequent impact on the achievable secret key
rates which is, as said before, is one of the fundamental performance guideline in QKD.
The proposed protocol, while having a negligible cost, can reduce the residual FER in
QKD systems, largely reducing the interaction required between the two parties involved,
increasing the key rate and protecting the secrecy of the information exchanged
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